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Executive	  summary	  and	  acknowledgements	  My	  doctoral	  thesis	  uses	  an	  interdisciplinary	  approach	  to	  tackle	  important	  issues	  in	  finance,	  game	  theory,	   and	   network	   theory.	   The	   first	   paper,	   “An	   intergenerational	   cross-­‐country	   swap”,	   co-­‐authored	  with	  Paolo	  Vanini,	  addresses	  the	   issue	  of	   intergenerational	  and	   international	  sharing	  of	   longevity	  and	  growth	  risks.	  Current	  research	  on	  worldwide	  demographic	  changes	  highlights	  the	   importance	  of	   longevity	   risk	   for	   financial	  markets	  and	   the	  need	   to	  devise	  optimal	  hedging	  vehicles.	  We	  present	  a	  potential	   financial	   innovation	  between	  two	  countries	  at	  different	  stages	  of	   economic	   development	   and	  with	   different	   long-­‐term	   challenges.	   This	   30-­‐year-­‐long	   swap	   is	  structured	  in	  such	  a	  way	  to	  capture	  the	  different	  timing	  of	  needed	  funds	  of	  the	  two	  countries	  and	  the	  funding	  capabilities	  of	  each	  generation:	  the	  more	  developed	  economy	  requires	  funds	  in	  the	  future	   to	  cover	  expenses	   for	   its	  ageing	  population,	  while	   the	  developing	  economy	  needs	   funds	  today	  to	  pay	  for	  educational,	  technological,	  and	  other	  infrastructural	  services.	  To	  price	  the	  swap,	  we	  apply	  an	  exponential-­‐utility-­‐based	  pricing	  method	  and	  define	  an	  interval	  of	  prices	  allowing	  a	  contract	   to	   be	   agreed	   upon.	   We	   show	   how	   the	   bid-­‐ask	   spread	   varies	   with	   respect	   to	   the	  governments’	  risk	  and	  time	  preferences.	  In	   the	   second	   paper,	   “Solidarity	   group	   lending	   and	   global	   games”,	   I	   analyse	   microfinance	  solidarity	  group	  lending	  within	  a	  global	  game	  framework.	  Group	  members	  invest	  independently	  in	  either	  a	  safe	  or	  a	  risky	  project.	  Ex	  ante	  observation	  and	  coordination	  on	  the	  choice	  of	  projects	  is	  not	  always	  possible.	  Though	  risky	  projects	  allow	  microentrepreneurs	  to	  extract	  risk	  premia,	  safe	   projects	   raise	   the	   possibility	   of	   success	   of	   the	   group	   loan,	   in	  which	   case	   group	  members	  benefit	   from	   access	   to	   business	   support	   services	   provided	   by	   the	   microfinance	   institution.	   I	  show	   how	   private	   beliefs	   concerning	   the	   strength	   of	   social	   cohesion	   within	   the	  microentrepreneurial	  community	  induces	  coordination	  on	  safe	  project	  choices.	  Microfinance	   lending	   is	   also	   the	   topic	   of	   the	   final	   paper,	   “Value-­‐chain	   financing	   and	   local	  interaction	  games”,	  but	  here	  I	  add	  a	  network	  perspective	  to	  the	  picture.	  Value-­‐chain	  financing	  is	  of	   great	   importance	   to	   the	   agricultural	   sector	   of	   most	   developing	   countries.	   Microfinance	  institutions	   may	   contribute	   to	   the	   strength	   of	   chain	   links	   by	   handing	   out	   loans.	   I	   view	   an	  agricultural	   value	   chain	   as	   a	   network,	  where	   links	   between	   nodes	   denote	   social	   and	   business	  relationships	   between	   chain	   actors.	   By	   studying	   internode	   relationships	   in	   terms	   of	   local	  interaction	   games,	   I	   address	   the	   issue	   of	   whether	   and	   how	   network	   structure	   and	   social	  cohesion	  may	   spread	   coordination	   on	   safe	   investment	   choices	   from	   a	   local	   level	   to	   the	   entire	  value	  chain.	  I	   am	   deeply	   grateful	   to	   my	   advisors,	   Paolo	   Vanini	   and	   Hyun	   Song	   Shin,	   for	   their	   support,	  guidance,	  and	  endless	  patience	  throughout	  the	  writing	  of	  this	  thesis.	  I	  also	  thank	  my	  colleagues	  at	  the	  Zürcher	  Kantonalbank	  for	  interesting	  discussions	  and	  comments	  on	  my	  research.	  	  
AN INTERGENERATIONAL CROSS-COUNTRY SWAP
MIRET PADOVANI AND PAOLO VANINI
Abstract. This paper addresses the issue of intergenerational and interna-
tional sharing of longevity and growth risks. Current research on worldwide
demographic changes highlights the importance of longevity risk on financial
markets and the need to devise optimal hedging vehicles. We present a poten-
tial financial innovation between two countries at different stages of economic
development and with different long-term challenges. This 30-year-long swap
is structured in such a way to capture the different timing of needed funds of
the two countries and the funding capabilities of each generation: the more
developed economy requires funds in the future to cover expenses for its ageing
population, while the developing economy needs funds today to pay for edu-
cational, technological, and other infrastructural services. To price the swap,
we apply an exponential-utility-based pricing method and define an interval of
prices allowing a contract to be agreed upon. We show how the bid-ask spread
varies with respect to the governments’ risk and time preferences.
1. Introduction
Countries at different stages of economic development face different long-term
challenges. On the one hand, take a country such as Switzerland, which faces the
challenge of being able to provide for the pensions and long-term care of its ageing
population without jeopardizing its economic competitiveness.1 On the other hand,
take Egypt, which faces the challenge of being able to attract sufficient funds and
encourage new businesses to foster its economic development; Egypt is not con-
strained by longevity-related expenses, and higher longevity due to better health
and living conditions may actually signify higher work productivity and faster eco-
nomic growth. So Switzerland faces longevity risk, while Egypt faces growth risk.
Rather than bear those risks, stakeholders in the two countries may benefit from
transferring them to the financial markets. Yet the question is how.
Date: First version: April 2009. This version: February 18, 2010.
Key words and phrases. Financial innovation; longevity risk; old-age dependency ratio; growth
risk; exponential-utility-based pricing; international finance; intergenerational risk-sharing; inter-
national risk-sharing.
We are thankful to Michel Habib, Hyun Song Shin, Alexander Wagner, and participants at
the seventh Swiss doctoral workshop in finance (Gerzensee, June 2008) for helpful comments
on a preliminary draft of the paper. Special thanks also go to our colleagues at the Zu¨rcher
Kantonalbank for interesting discussions and feedback. Part of this research has been carried out
within the research project on “Credit risk and non-standard sources of risk in finance” led by
Rajna Gibson at the National Centre of Competence in Research “Financial Valuation and Risk
Management” (NCCR FINRISK). The NCCR FINRISK is a research instrument of the Swiss
National Science Foundation.
1See the 2008 Swiss Health Observatory study [SBJR+08].
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2005 2020 2030 2040
Australia AAA AA BBB Non-IG
Canada AAA AAA AAA AA
France AAA A Non-IG Non-IG
Italy AA A Non-IG Non-IG
Japan AA Non-IG Non-IG Non-IG
Spain AAA AAA BBB Non-IG
Sweden AAA AAA A Non-IG
United Kingdom AAA AAA A Non-IG
USA AAA BBB Non-IG Non-IG
Table 1.1. Hypothetical projected long-term sovereign ratings ac-
cording to baseline scenario if no adjustment in government budget
occurs. Source: [Kra02].
We may very naively divide the world economy into two groups: developed and
developing economies; or - political correctness aside - rich and poor. The former
countries are short longevity, the latter are long longevity.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. We delineate the structure of a
potential future financial innovation enabling one party - the rich country - to
mitigate its longevity risk and the other - the poor country - to widen its pool
of funding options. This intergenerational cross-country swap would mirror the
different timing of needed funds of the two countries and the funding capacities
of each generation. Secondly, we price the swap using an exponential-utility-based
pricing method and determine the highest possible bid and lowest possible ask
price. Finally, we show how the bid-ask spread varies with governments’ risk and
time preferences.
This swap can be seen as a “radical financial innovation”, in the interpretation
given by Shiller [Shi04b]. Indeed, this swap permits risk management to be extended
far beyond its former realm, covering a new class of risk: population ageing. It
also changes the assumptions about what can be insured and hedged - the old-age
dependency ratio - and has a potential major impact on human welfare.
A crucial aspect in this framework is the interrelationship between longevity
and growth risks, since inadequate management of the high costs associated with
an ageing society may lead a country to economic deterioration. A 2002 Standard
& Poor’s study [Kra02] documents how ageing-related government liabilities may
result in downgrades of sovereign ratings if no adjustment in government budget
occurs (see table 1.1). This highlights the important role governments should take
as managers of key long-term risks related to population ageing, as discussed by
Groome et al. [GBH+06]. The literature investigating the economic effects of
population ageing on financial markets and possible policy reforms is quite vast;2
we refer to Groome et al. [GBR06] for a review of the most recent research to date.
Our interest here lies in international financial innovations motivated by world-
wide asymmetric demographic trends. Bryant [Bry06] and Batini et al. [BCM06]
independently study the interactions between developed and developing countries
2See, among others, Abel [Abe03] and Brooks [Bro02].
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as their populations follow different evolution paths. Their analyses show that pop-
ulation ageing in industrialised countries will reduce growth and negatively affect
savings and investments; on the other hand, developing countries will enjoy a “de-
mographic dividend” that should result in stronger growth over the next couple of
decades, before ageing sets in. Takling pretty much the same issue, Alho and Borgy
[AB07] employ a multi-regional model to analyze the uncertainty induced into key
macroeconomic variables by uncertain future demographics. The authors observe
that the macroeconomic adjustments can differ substantially if they consider inde-
pendence or high correlation across the regions.
In a series of thought-provoking studies, Robert Shiller and his co-authors stress
the desirability of an international risk transfer of economic growth risks.3 Consider
the exemplifying “radical financial innovation” suggested by Shiller [Shi04a]:
“Suppose that a ten-year contract were made between a poor coun-
try on one side - in this example, India - and such wealthier coun-
tries as Canada, Mexico, the United States, Brazil, Japan, France,
Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom on the other, to swap
unexpected future changes in Indian GDP for unexpected future
changes in the combined GDPs of the other countries. (Shiller
[Shi04a])”
The swap we suggest differs from the one above in that it combines growth with
longevity risk. Eijffinger and Wagner [EW03] show that international risk-sharing
gains through existing financial assets actually result from intertemporal rather
than cross-sectional gains, particularly because of less severe incentive problems.
Such evidence provides strong support for the idea that a country which is short
longevity would gain if it were to transfer its longevity risk through an intergenera-
tional agreement with another country which is long longevity. The open question
this paper aims to answer is: how can one concretely and successfully structure
derivatives for a simultaneous intergenerational and international risk transfer?
Our derivative idea is also related to several recent studies in financial engi-
neering - namely, on longevity-based securities,4 economic derivatives,5 as well as
3See Shiller [Shi04a] and Athanasoulis and Shiller [AS01].
4The idea behind derivatives such as longevity bonds (see Blake and Burrows [BB01], Blake et al.
[BCDM06]) and longevity swaps (see Dowd et al. [DBCD06]) is a risk-exchange contract between
two parties, one being short longevity and the other being long longevity. Typical counterparties
for such a contract may be the sponsor of a pension plan and a life insurer. The payoffs of these
derivatives depend upon the realized value of an index of longevity rates. Several investment
banks and option exchanges - namely, JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse, and Deutsche
Bo¨rse - have recently developed longevity indices with the aim to contribute to the take-off of
the longevity derivatives market. Mitchell et al. [MPSY06] provide an interesting overview of
financial product innovations in this field.
5Economic derivatives allow investors to take direct positions on the outcomes of macroeconomic
data releases. The first economic derivatives - futures and options on non-farm payroll figures -
started trading in 2002 on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange but were subsequently discontinued
in 2007. Among the reasons given were lack of interest and illiquidity; indeed, little disagreement
on the outcome of data makes it difficult for traders to find a counterparty willing to take the
other side of the trade. There is ongoing work on how to best structure financial derivatives to
mitigate event risks, such as adverse fluctuations in unemployment or national income figures (see
Gadanecz et al. [GMU07]). Similar to the longevity derivatives market, the economic derivatives
market is currently struggling to take off. Economic derivatives do entail, however, lower basis
risk than more conventional instruments for taking positions on macroeconomic data.
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commercial microfinance.6 We do not discuss this literature here, but do high-
light their importance, since they give an idea of the challenges encountered when
engineering, pricing, and hedging innovative financial products.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section illustrates
the structuring of the swap and justifies the choice of the old-age dependency ratio
as its underlying variable. The following section applies an exponential-utility-
based method to price this innovative payoff in an incomplete market. Section 4
discusses how the arbitrage-free interval of possible swap prices varies with respect
to the model parameters. Section 5 concludes and outlines future research work.
2. Structuring the swap
The financial innovation we present is an agreement between a rich country’s
government and a poor country’s government to exchange a sequence of cash flows
at specified settlement dates. Its structure is designed in such a way to capture
the temporal asymmetry between the two countries: the richer country needs funds
in the future when it will have to cover expenses for the elderly, while the poorer
country needs funds today to pay for educational, technological, and other infras-
tructural services.
The swap has a long-term duration, say 30 years as for available government
debt. The rich country represents the fixed leg, the poor country the floating leg.
The net cash flows from rich to poor are much higher in the first years of the
contract’s life, but this asymmetry is reversed over time, mirroring the different
timing of needed and available funds stated above.
The swap’s structure begs the question of how far ahead one can forecast growth
and whether 30-year-ahead growth and longevity forecasts can be sufficiently reli-
able. Given the actual difficulty in forecasting growth and longevity over a period
exceeding 18 months,7 the swap is rolled over every 10 years. This also allows the
parties to take into account sovereign default risk: If country creditworthiness de-
clines, then the swap spread can be raised at the time the contract is rolled over.
But as with any rolling strategy, it is important to account for possible rolling or
tracking errors and their severity.
The main advantage for the rich country in this fixed-for-floating swap is to
transform future cash-outs at a floating rate - its elderly-related expenses which
depend on a stochastic population ageing rate - into payments at a fixed rate, thus
locking in a “sustainable” population ageing rate. As for the poor country, its main
advantage is to hedge against adverse changes in the development aid it receives
due to population ageing in the donor country. A long-term contract as this 30-
year swap entails, though, the risk of significant fluctuations in exchange rates and
interest rates. These risks may be hedged together by adding a (fixed-for-floating)
cross-currency interest-rate swap, to be rolled over during the 30-year lifetime of
the swap.
6The objective of commercial microfinance is to increase the set of funding alternatives available to
poor countries and microfinance institutions beyond the plain intergovernmental loans they more
typically receive. As an example, Bystrom [Bys08] studies microfinance collateralized loan obliga-
tions as a tool for economic development. Another type of product are microfinance investment
funds.
7See Isiklar and Lahiri [IL07].
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A couple of benefits of this intergenerational cross-country swap over a simple
developmental loan from rich to poor are particularly relevant. One first benefit is
the possibility for both parties to spread the cash out- and inflows over time. Sec-
ondly, the swap provides the possibility of including a rebate in case the contract
is interrupted because of sovereign default or economic recession in either country.
But this swap also offers advantages over a longevity derivative between two coun-
terparties based in the rich country. The problem of finding a counterparty willing
to take on the long-longevity side of the transaction is often cited by practitioners as
the main problem currently hindering the take-off of longevity derivatives. We will
show in what follows that a poor country may be willing to assume the longevity
risk of a richer country if this risk is forecast to adversely affect the developmental
support it receives from the rich country.
The issue of identifying the variable on which to base the swap’s cash flows is
not trivial, given that no existing measure to date serves our purpose fully and
satisfactorily. We need a rate that reveals the strength with which longevity trends
impact each country’s wealth endowments.
Gross domestic product (GDP) is by far the most widely-used indicator of eco-
nomic growth, but it does have its shortcomings, too. A crucial shortcoming of
GDP measures is that they do not take into account life expectancy or other de-
mographic variables such as fertility, which are important indicators of a country’s
well-being. What is important for the purpose of this study, however, is to quantify
the burden of elderly-related expenses on an economy. These expenses tend to ac-
tually raise GDP figures through an increase in government expenditures; but, as
discussed above, longevity is forecast to negatively affect the economy of the more
advanced economies.
Several studies in growth theory attempt to come up with a growth measure
reflecting the welfare gains from both quality and quantity of life.8 The aim of
longevity-adjusted growth rates is to quantify the extent to which national eco-
nomic growth is affected by population age structure. The literature on the rela-
tionship between income growth and life expectancy has taken off in the seventies
following studies by Usher [Ush73] and Preston [Pre75]. There have been sev-
eral country-specific applications since then; e.g. Ponthie´re [Pon08] applies the
Usher-Williamson-Miller framework to include longevity data into Belgian national
income accounting. In a major study in this field, Becker et al. [BPS06] develop
a statistical model that accounts for the impact of longevity on the evolution of
welfare across almost 100 countries from 1960 to 2000. Their model measures the
growth of individual income plus the value placed on the growth of an individuals
life expectancy. A common result of all these studies is that, by not taking into
account increases in longevity, GDP underestimates the extent to which developing
countries are gaining relative to developed countries.
One indicator of the economic burden of rising population longevity is the old-
age dependency ratio. This gives the number of retirees in percentage of the total
population in working age, i.e.
old-age dependency ratio =
population aged 65+
population aged 15-64
.
8See Becker et al. [BPS06].
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The evolution of this ratio depends on future trends in fertility, mortality and in-
ternational migration. A higher forecast dependency ratio is a clear signal of an
increasing burden of ageing-related expenses and of the need for governments to
put in place the necessary budget reforms. Given the availability of historical and
forecast data on the old-age dependency ratio for several countries and their wide-
spread use in policy reform discussions, we choose this variable as the underlying
of our swap.9
Having identified the underlying and the main features of the swap, we need
to guarantee that such a long-term contract does not neglect the risk of sovereign
default. A knock-out feature or credit trigger acts as an insurance against sovereign
default and causes the payments from rich to poor to be interrupted as soon as the
creditworthiness of the poor country falls below a certain level. In a worst-case
scenario, the payments from rich to poor cease within a few years and can be taken
as a charitable payment.
3. Pricing the swap
Given the innovative nature of our swap’s structure, we need to price in an in-
complete market. The literature on pricing derivatives when risk-neutral valuation
is not sufficient is vast. We here follow a utility-based valuation approach, which
relies on the individual rationality requirement of the agent’s expected utility from
participation in the contract to (weakly) exceed his reservation utility. We take the
exponential utility function, which implies constant relative risk aversion and linear
risk tolerance. This utility function is widely employed in the literature because of
its mathematically tractability. For the mathematical details of exponential util-
ity indifference valuation we refer to Mania and Schweizer [MS05] and Frei and
Schweizer [FS08].
In a complete financial market every contingent claim can be perfectly replicated
by a portfolio of traded securities and therefore admits a unique arbitrage-free price.
In an incomplete market, to every contingent claim is associated an interval of
arbitrage-free prices and arbitrage arguments alone are not sufficient to lead to a
unique price, i.e. to a replication strategy. As the lower and upper endpoints of
this interval coincide with the sub- and super-replication costs of the contingent
claim, respectively, any price in the middle will lead to a possible profit & loss at
maturity. Hence, the choice of an arbitrage-free price must be made with respect
to another criterion.
The utility indifference pricing method has been proved to provide a narrower
range of price bounds than the arbitrage-free pricing method.10 The pricing of the
swap is based on the condition of individual rationality for both parties to enter
the deal. The participation constraints lead to an interval of prices acceptable to
both the seller and the buyer.
We make use of the following notation:
9The United Nations Population Division (UNPD) publishes forecasts of the old-age dependency
ratio for most countries in the world every year. The most recent population projects are reported
in [UNP07]. To project the population until 2050, the UNPD relies on a set of assumptions
regarding future trends in fertility, mortality, and international migration. Because future trends
cannot be known with certainty, several projection variants are produced. We refer to the UN
study [UNP07] for data on historical and forecast old-age dependency ratios around the world
according to the medium, high, and low projection variants.
10See Mania and Schweizer [MS05].
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• Wt denotes the wealth endowment of the rich government at time t - na-
tional budget set aside for pensions and long term health care - adjusted
for reference population size and inflation;
• W˜t denotes the wealth endowment of the poor government at time t -
national budget set aside for infrastructure projects - adjusted for reference
population size and inflation;
• sask denotes the fixed ask swap rate;
• sbid denotes the fixed bid swap rate;
• t = 0, 1, . . . , T denotes the time frame, with T the contract maturity;
• U(W ) denotes the utility function;
• Dt(Wt) denotes the discount factor;
• PW denotes the probability law of the wealth dynamics;
• Pa denotes the probability law of the old-age dependency ratio dynamics.
Note that we use the tilde notation ˜ for parameters related to the poor country.
The indifference valuation criterium demands that the investor valuing a contin-
gent claim should achieve the same expected utility both in case he does not possess
the claim and in case he does possess the claim but his initial capital is reduced
by the amount of indifference value of the claim. In this framework, rich and poor
country must be made indifferent between bearing longevity and income growth
risks without entering a swap agreement under a medium population projection
variant and no longer bearing these risks after entering the swap agreement. Thus,
the indifference values of the swap to the rich and the poor country are defined
through
V (W0, sbid, a0) ≥ V (W0, 0, 0)
and
V˜
(
W˜0, sask, a0
)
≥ V˜
(
W˜0, 0, 0
)
,
respectively.
The developed economy (or fixed leg or buyer of the swap) pays fixed value and
receives realized value at each settlement date, so that its participation constraint
is defined by
(3.1)
EPW×Pa0
[
T∑
t=0
Dt (Wt) ∗ U (Wt, sbid, at)
]
≥ EPW0
[
T∑
t=0
Dt (Wt) ∗ U (Wt, 0, 0)
]
.
This gives the maximum bid price. We simplify the pricing framework by assuming
that the government spends its entire budget; hence, we do not include a savings
rate.
The developing economy (or floating leg or seller of the swap) pays realized value
and receives fixed value at each settlement date, so that its participation constraint
is defined by
(3.2)
EPW˜×Pa0
[
T∑
t=0
Dt
(
W˜t
)
∗ U
(
W˜t, sask, at
)]
≥ EPW˜0
[
T∑
t=0
Dt
(
W˜t
)
∗ U
(
W˜t, 0, 0
)]
.
This gives the minimum ask price. These two participation constraints allow us to
derive a range of prices within which the swap price (i.e. the fixed swap rate) needs
to lie.
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We describe social welfare by the negative exponential utility function:
(3.3) U (xt) = − e−λxt , λ ∈ (0,∞).
Each country discounts its future utility according to its specific social discount
rate. The discounted marginal utility of government income is specified by
u = U ′ (Wt) e−ρt = λ e−λWt e−ρt
and the social discount rate by
(3.4) dt = − u˙
u
= ρ+ λW˙t ≈ ρ+ λ ∗ (Wt −Wt−1) ,
where ρ denotes the social rate of time preference, representing the value society
attaches to present consumption relative to future consumption. Hence, the social
discount factor is given by
(3.5) Dt (Wt) = e−dtt = e−ρt−λ∗(Wt−Wt−1)t.
The environmental finance literature has highlighted several reasons why it is in-
appropriate to simply use market risk-free long-term interest rates, such as the
rates on government bonds with equivalent maturity.11 The primary reason is
intergenerational concerns, which a government is supposed to take into account
when initiating projects that are deemed to affect future generations. The impor-
tance given to future generations depends on current wealth and expected future
wealth levels. If age structure changes are expected to slow down future economic
growth rates, the social discount rate should decline accordingly. This translates
into greater sacrifices on behalf of the current generation to take into account future
generations’ well-being. Pearce et al. [PGHK03] argue that in the extreme case of
projected long-term recession, the social discount rate should be negative.12
Proposition 3.1. Consider the two participation constraints (3.1) and (3.2), the
utility function (3.3), and the discount factor (3.5). Then the fixed swap rate, s,
must lie within a range with upper bound
sbid =
1
λ
(
ln
T∑
t=0
e−ρtEPW0
[
e−λWt(1+t)+λWt−1t
]
− ln
T∑
t=0
e−ρtEPW×Pa0
[
e−λWt(1+t)+λWt−1t−λat
])
(3.6)
and lower bound
sask =
1
λ˜
(
ln
T∑
t=0
e−ρ˜tEPW˜×Pa0
[
e−λ˜W˜t(1+t)+λ˜W˜t−1t+λ˜at
]
− ln
T∑
t=0
e−ρ˜tEPW˜0
[
e−λ˜W˜t(1+t)+λ˜W˜t−1t
])
.(3.7)
11See Pearce et al. [PGHK03].
12The question whether society should place a lower value on a future gain or loss than on the
same gain or loss occurring now is highly controversial. A large body of literature analyzes social
discounting for environmental policies and how governments should value climate change damages;
see, among others, Weitzman [Wei01], Weitzman [Wei07], Pearce et al. [PGHK03], and Hepburn
[Hep06]. Application examples include the Stern review on the economics of climate change and
the cost-benefit analyses employed by the Copenhagen Consensus to examine solutions to ten of
the world’s biggest challenges.
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Proof. See appendix section A.1. 
Equations (3.6) and (3.7) show that the price bounds are a function of λ,
EPW0 [Wt], and E
PW×Pa
0 [Wt, at] for the bid price; λ˜, E
PW˜
0
[
W˜t
]
, and EPW˜×Pa0
[
W˜t, at
]
for the ask price. Furthermore, these price bounds need to satisfy a couple of con-
ditions. First of all, both the minimum price the seller is willing to receive for the
swap and the maximum price the buyer is willing to pay for the swap must be
positive. Secondly, the maximum bid price should not be lower than the minimum
ask price; otherwise, no agreement between the two parties is possible.
The next step in pricing the swap is to define the stochastic paths of the three
sources of uncertainty, at, Wt, and W˜t. Forecasts for years 2010 up to 2030 show
a clear upward trend in population ageing in the industrial countries, though this
trend may experience ‘up’ or ‘down’ episodes, for example, due to extreme heat
waves. We do not get into the details of longevity forecasting, but nevertheless
highlight a few contentious points, such as whether and how medical advances
should be taken into account, whether or not there exists a biological limit to life,
and whether lifespans could eventually be extended through genetic changes or non-
genetic interactions. Summing up, we may represent this series by the following
upward-trending process:
(3.8) at = a0 + δt+ at ,
where the error term, at , follows an autocorrelation process with a lag of order k:
at =
k∑
i=1
ςt
a
t−i + σ
aξat , ξ
a ∼ N (0, 1) .
Fitting this process to historical and forecast data for Switzerland for years 1991
to 2050, we have derived parameter values a0 = 23.4 and δ = 0.45.13 In a future
companion paper, we will estimate the parameters of the autocorrelation process
and the lag order for a number of selected countries.
Evolution of the wealth endowment over time in the developed country can be
thought to follow a mean-reverting process, converging to some long-term value.
The wealth level is adjusted for inflation and for population growth, and so is
expressed in real per-capita terms. This value of mean reversion can be thought
of as a proportion of national income the government desires to devote to elderly-
related expenses, e.g. long-term health care. Hence, this process needs to mirror
the evolution of per-capita national income in real terms.
We may take the following AR(1) process:
(3.9) Wt = α+ βWt−1 + t, 0 ≤ β < 1,
where 1 − β measures the speed of mean reversion in the rate of wealth changes.
The error term is given by
(3.10) t = σξt + σ
m∑
i=0
ηiξ
a
t−i, ξ, ξ
a ∼ N (0, 1) .
with 0 ≤ m ≤ +∞ and where ξt captures the randomness due to all factors other
than the uncertainty related to the population age structure; ξat , . . . , ξ
a
t−m are the
13We have used publicly-available data from the Bundesamt fu¨r Statistik and the State Secretariat
for Economic Affairs.
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current and lagged innovations of the old-age dependency ratio; ηt are the sensitivity
parameters between the wealth process and population ageing. In the extreme case
of W and a being independent, i.e. when population ageing has no effect on the
wealth endowment, the sensitivity parameters ηt are all equal to zero, so that the
error term is simply an i.i.d. standard normal random variable, i.e. t = σξt. The
solution to (3.9) is
(3.11) Wt = α
t−1∑
i=0
βi + βtW0 +
t−1∑
i=0
βit−i.
For the developing economy we take the following AR(1) process:
(3.12) W˜t = α˜+ β˜W˜t−1 + γ˜t+ ˜t, 0 ≤ β˜ < 1, γ > 0,
where, once again, 1− β˜ measures the speed of mean reversion and the error term
is given by
(3.13) ˜t = σ˜ξ˜t + σ˜
m∑
i=0
η˜iξ
a
t−i, ξ˜, ξ
a ∼ N (0, 1) .
The term γ˜t allows for a small upward trend which captures economic growth of
the developing economy. The solution to (3.12) is
(3.14) W˜t = α˜
t−1∑
i=0
β˜i + β˜tW˜0 + γ˜
t−1∑
i=0
tβ˜i +
t−1∑
i=0
β˜i˜t−i.
We may solve the geometric sum in (3.11) and rewrite the equation in a more
compact and tractable form as
(3.15) Wt = ϕ0 + ϕ1βt +
t−1∑
i=0
βit−i,
with
ϕ0 =
α
1− β , ϕ1 = −
α
1− β +W0.
Similarly for (3.14) we obtain
(3.16) W˜t = ϕ˜0 + ϕ˜1β˜t + ϕ˜2t+
t−1∑
i=0
β˜i˜t−i,
with
ϕ˜0 =
α˜
1− β˜ , ϕ˜1 = −
α˜+ γ˜
1− β˜ + W˜0, ϕ˜2 =
γ˜
1− β˜ .
Inserting (3.14) and (3.11) into the bounds (3.6) and (3.7) gives us explicit ex-
pressions for the minimum ask price and maximum bid price, as outlined in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Under wealth dynamics (3.9) and (3.12) and population ageing
(3.8), the fixed swap rate, s, must lie within a range with upper bound
sbid =
1
λ
(
ln
T∑
t=0
ΨtEPW0
[
e−Λt
]− ln T∑
t=0
ΨatE
PW×Pa
0
[
e−Λ
a
t
])
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and lower bound
sask =
1
λ˜
(
ln
T∑
t=0
Ψ˜atE
PW˜×Pa
0
[
e−Λ˜
a
t
]
− ln
T∑
t=0
Ψ˜tE
PW˜
0
[
e−Λ˜t
])
,
with
Ψt := e−ρte−λ[ϕ0+ϕ1β
t−1[(1+t)β−t]], Ψat = Ψt e
−λδt,
Λt := λ
[
(1 + t) t + t
t−1∑
i=0
βit−i
]
, Λat = Λt − λat ,
Ψ˜t := e−ρ˜te−λ˜[ϕ˜0+ϕ˜1β˜
t−1[(1+t)β˜−t]+2ϕ˜2t], Ψ˜at = Ψ˜t e
λ˜δt,
and
Λ˜t := λ˜
[
(1 + t) ˜t + t
t−1∑
i=0
β˜i˜t−i
]
, Λ˜at = Λ˜t + λ˜˜
a
t .
The formulas for the price bounds will differ when we assume the two stochastic
processes Wt and at to be either dependent or independent of each other. The
latter case of processes’ dependence is obviously more realistic and is precisely
what motivates our innovation idea, but it is equally important to check how the
price bounds look like in the former case, since only by doing so can we deduce
interesting comparative statics.
4. Exponential-utility-based price bounds
Consider first the case where the stochastic processesWt and at are independent.
Proposition 4.1. Take Wt and at independent. Under wealth dynamics (3.9) and
(3.12) and population ageing (3.8), the fixed swap rate, s, must lie within a range
with upper bound
sbid =
1
λ
(
ln
T∑
t=0
ΨtΩt − ln
T∑
t=0
ΨatΩ
a
t
)
and lower bound
sask =
1
λ˜
(
ln
T∑
t=0
Ψ˜at Ω˜
a
t − ln
T∑
t=0
Ψ˜tΩ˜t
)
,
with
Ψt := e−ρte−λ[ϕ0+ϕ1β
t−1[(1+t)β−t]], Ψat = Ψt e
−λδt,
Ωt := e
−λ22 σ2
[
(1+t)2+t2(∑t−1i=1 βi)2], Ωat := e−λ22
[
σ2
[
(1+t)2+t2(∑t−1i=1 βi)2]+kς2t+(σa)2],
Ψ˜t := e−ρ˜te−λ˜[ϕ˜0+ϕ˜1β˜
t−1[(1+t)β˜−t]+2ϕ˜2t], Ψ˜at = Ψ˜t e
λ˜δt,
and
Ω˜t := e
− λ˜22 σ˜2
[
(1+t)2+t2(∑t−1i=1 β˜i)2], Ω˜at := e− λ˜22
[
σ˜2
[
(1+t)2+t2(∑t−1i=1 β˜i)2]+kς2t+(σa)2].
Proof. See appendix section A.2. 
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Figure 4.1. Changes in the bid-ask spread with respect to
changes in ρ and ρ˜. Prices in CHF billions.
So if we assume the wealth endowments in both the rich and poor countries to
be totally independent of population ageing in the rich country, the maximum bid
price and the minimum ask price are a function of the risk aversion parameters,
social discount rates, process parameters forW and a. To satisfy the two conditions
of positive price bounds and a non-empty price interval, the following inequalities
need to hold:
λδt 6= 0; λ
2kς2t + (σ
a)2
2
6= 0;
(4.1) ln
T∑
t=0
ΨtΩt > ln
T∑
t=0
ΨatΩ
a
t ;
(4.2) ln
T∑
t=0
Ψ˜at Ω˜
a
t > ln
T∑
t=0
Ψ˜tΩ˜t.
Whereas condition (4.1) always holds true, condition (4.2) only holds true for T
greater than some critical value T ∗. Indeed, given the long-term character of the
risks faced by the two counterparties, a contract with too short a maturity would
not provide a useful hedge against these risks.
Sensitivity analysis allows us to observe whether and how the price interval
widens or narrows for different parameter values. To check for the intuition behind
the sensitivity analysis and to graphically illustrate the price changes, we apply the
model to population and economic data on Switzerland.14
First of all, as contract life T increases, both sbid and sask increase. So it will
not be worthwhile for the rich and poor country to enter a contract with too short a
14Without loss of generality and for illustrative purposes, we assume rich and poor countries to
have the same risk and time preferences. In future work, it will be interesting to check how our
results vary as we take differing parameters for the two counterparties.
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Figure 4.2. Changes in the bid-ask spread with respect to
changes in (σa)2. Prices in CHF billions.
Figure 4.3. Changes in the bid-ask spread with respect to
changes in δ. Prices in CHF billions.
maturity. This is a rather intuitive result, since the rich country does not forecast to
experience longevity-related budget problems until some time in the further future.
For higher social rates of time preference ρ and ρ˜, both countries quote lower
prices; however, the decrease in the quoted bid price is much stronger and the price
interval narrows considerably with an increase in both countries’ discount rates.
This is illustrated in figure 4.1. Note, however, that the stronger decrease in the
bid price is only true in absolute terms; in relative terms, the decrease in both
prices is roughly equally strong.
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Figure 4.4. Changes in the bid-ask spread with respect to
changes in λ and λ˜. Prices in CHF billions.
For an increasing volatility in the innovations of the population ageing process,
σa, both sbid and sask increase, but rather mildly. Therefore, as figure 4.2 illus-
trates, the price interval does not change significantly.
If the old-age dependency ratio is expected to increase at a faster pace, i.e. for
a higher value of δ, both the seller and the buyer of the swap will quote higher
prices. As figure 4.3 illustrates, there is a critical value of δ which guarantees that
the seller will quote a positive price; whereas, for too low a δ value, the seller will
not be interested in entering such a contract. This result confirms precisely our
intuition behind such a financial innovation, since the swap only makes economic
sense if there is a severe population ageing risk to be hedged.
The more interesting result from the sensitivity analysis is with regards to the
rich country’s risk aversion parameter. Figure 4.4 shows indeed a kink in the shape
of the bid price curve. This shape points out to the country being more interested
in hedging its risk of severe population ageing either when it is relatively little risk
averse or very risk averse. We believe that this interesting shape of the bid price
curve is worthy of further investigation.
We now take the two processes Wt and at to be dependent of each other and
check how the price interval varies as the interdependence between the two processes
comes into play.
Proposition 4.2. Take Wt and at dependent as defined in (3.10). Under wealth
dynamics (3.9) and (3.12) and population ageing (3.8), the fixed swap rate, s, must
lie within a range with upper bound
sbid =
1
λ
(
ln
T∑
t=0
ΨtΩt − ln
T∑
t=0
ΨatΩ
a
t
)
and lower bound
sask =
1
λ˜
(
ln
T∑
t=0
Ψ˜at Ω˜
a
t − ln
T∑
t=0
Ψ˜tΩ˜t
)
,
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with
Ψt := e−ρte−λ[ϕ0+ϕ1β
t−1[(1+t)β−t]], Ψat = Ψt e
−λδt,
Ωt := e
[−λ(1+t)σ−λ(1+t)σ∑mj=0 ηj−λt∑t−1i=1 βiσ−λt∑t−1i=1 βiσ∑mj=0 ηj]2
2 ,
Ωat := e
[−λ(1+t)σ−λ(1+t)σ∑mj=0 ηj−λt∑t−1i=1 βiσ−λt∑t−1i=1 βiσ∑mj=0 ηj−λ∑ki=1 ςt−λσa]2
2 ,
Ψ˜t := e−ρ˜te−λ˜[ϕ˜0+ϕ˜1β˜
t−1[(1+t)β˜−t]+2ϕ˜2t], Ψ˜at = Ψ˜t e
λ˜δt,
Ω˜t := e
1
2 [−λ˜(1+t)σ˜−λ˜(1+t)σ˜
∑m
j=0 η˜j−λ˜t
∑t−1
i=1 β˜
iσ˜−λ˜t∑t−1i=1 β˜iσ˜∑mj=0 η˜j]2 ,
and
Ω˜at := e
1
2 [−λ˜(1+t)σ˜−λ˜(1+t)σ˜
∑m
j=0 η˜j−λ˜t
∑t−1
i=1 β˜
iσ˜−λ˜t∑t−1i=1 βiσ˜∑mj=0 ηj+λ˜∑ki=1 ςt+λ˜σa]2 .
Proof. See appendix section A.3. 
The inherent market price of risk for the old age dependency ratio results from
the inability to hedge the risk of an ageing population. I.e. the interrelationship
between population ageing in the developed country and the wealth endowments in
both countries plays an important role in determining the risk premium embedded
in the value of this contract.
If the rich country’s wealth endowment is very sensitive to the ageing of its
population, then it is more interested in entering the swap agreement and is willing
to pay more to hedge against adverse demographic developments. This raises the
maximum bid quote. Similarly, if the poor country’s wealth endowment is very
sensitive to the ageing of the rich country’s population, then it is more interested in
entering the swap agreement and is willing to receive less to hedge against adverse
demographic developments. This is especially the case if the poor country is highly
dependent on financial aid from the rich country and is at risk of receiving less aid
if the rich country needs to devote extra funds to its own elderly population. It
may be interesting to check the extent to which developmental aid flows are or may
be in the future affected by population ageing in the donor countries.
The amount of the risk premium can also be shown to depend on the finan-
cial position of both countries, too. Not only does the sensitivity of the wealth
endowment matter, but also the amount of government income invested in the en-
dowment. Higher values of W0 and W˜0 raise ϕ1 and ϕ˜1, thus shifting the bid-ask
interval towards lower prices. So countries entering the swap agreement with higher
wealth are likely to demand a lower risk premium.
5. Challenges
The swap we have presented throughout the previous sections does not yet exist.
We may think of three significant challenges arising when implementing this inter-
generational cross-country swap. First of all, what percentage of its GDP would the
rich country be willing to pay for longevity protection? Given our model assump-
tions, together with historical GDP and forecast longevity data for Switzerland, we
estimate the maximum bid price to lie between 3 to 5 billion Swiss francs, which
is roughly not more than 1% of current real Swiss GDP.15 We need to compare
this figure with the amount of funds the Swiss government forecasts to spend on
pensions and long-term health care over the next three decades. According to the
base scenario outlined in the Swiss Health Observatory study [SBJR+08], long-term
15Data as of end of 2008, according to the Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs.
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health care costs will rise by 141.9% from 2005 to 2030 to 17.8 billion Swiss francs
(keeping 2005 prices constant); this is equivalent to 2.8% of Swiss GDP. Though this
may hint to the feasibility of the swap, the decision ultimately remains a political
decision.
Another challenge concerns the impact that a transaction of such magnitude
could have on currency markets. The announcement of very large sums of money
denominated in a certain currency flowing from one country to the other may
significantly destabilize exchange rates. Given the large sums already exchanged
by central banks through FX swaps when conducting their monetary policies, it is
to be checked how much “capacity” the FX markets are still able to bare at the
time of contract conclusion.
Finally, we have previously mentioned the risks entailed by rolling over a deriv-
ative contract. These are related to the agent’s regret in case the bid-ask spread
in one period is far above or below the spread in the previous period; if applying
backward induction, there is the risk that one of the counterparties will decide not
to participate. Take, for example, the buyer of the swap: if the bid-ask spread
in the second period is such that the minimum ask price lies above the maximum
bid price quoted in the first period, then - through backward induction - the buyer
would have been better off not entering the contract in the first place. This rollover
risk cannot be hedged and, as such, is per se an interesting matter worthy of future
analysis.
6. Conclusions and future research
The question we set off to answer is whether there is a rationale for a financial
innovation whereby a developed economy would swap its longevity risk against
the growth risk of a developing economy. Our answer is yes. Having identified
the old-age dependency ratio as the appropriate underlying variable, we proceeded
to price the innovative swap structure. We applied an exponential-utility-based
pricing method and determined an interval of swap prices, any one of which makes
an agreement between the two countries plausible. Yet this begs the question of
which final price between maximum bid price and minimum ask price will actually
be chosen. As this swap is an over-the-counter contract, liquidity issues are here
irrelevant. So what is crucial to consider at this stage is the political strength of
the two countries; agreements of international finance are notoriously guided by
political issues which cannot be captured by financial pricing models. Intuitively
though, the final swap price will converge to the minimum ask price as the rich
country’s political strength relative to the poor country increases. Similarly, the
final swap price will converge to the maximum bid price as the rich country’s
political strength relative to the poor country decreases. We could include some
parameter to illustrate this basic intuition, but this would not induce any significant
changes to the results derived in the paper.
In a following paper we will estimate the dynamics W and a for a selected group
of countries and check which countries could benefit from such an intergenerational
agreement. We aim to quantify the swap rates by considering the participation
constraints under alternative scenarios of demographic changes. Other issues we
aim to investigate in future work include the channels through which banks’ product
strategies are influenced by asymmetric demographic trends, as well as the extent
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to which developmental aid and microfinance innovations are related to trends in
population ageing in donor countries.
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Appendix A. Proofs
This section contains detailed proofs to all propositions in the paper.
A.1. Proof of proposition 3.1.
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EPW˜×Pa0
[
T∑
t=0
Dt
(
W˜t
)
∗ U
(
W˜t, sask, at
)]
≥ EPW˜0
[
T∑
t=0
Dt
(
W˜t
)
∗ U
(
W˜t, 0, 0
)]
EPW˜×Pa0
[
−
T∑
t=0
e−ρ˜t−λ˜∗(W˜t−W˜t−1)t e−λ˜(W˜t+sask−at)
]
≥ EPW˜0
[
−
T∑
t=0
e−ρ˜t−λ˜∗(W˜t−W˜t−1)t e−λ˜W˜t
]
−e−λ˜sask
T∑
t=0
EPW˜×Pa0
[
e−ρ˜t−λ˜∗(W˜t−W˜t−1)t−λ˜(W˜t−at)
]
≥ −
T∑
t=0
EPW˜0
[
e−ρ˜t−λ˜∗(W˜t−W˜t−1)t−λ˜W˜t
]
so that
e−λ˜sask ≤
∑T
t=0 E
PW˜
0
[
e−ρ˜t−λ˜∗(W˜t−W˜t−1)t−λ˜W˜t
]
∑T
t=0 E
PW˜×Pa
0
[
e−ρ˜t−λ˜∗(W˜t−W˜t−1)t−λ˜(W˜t−at)
]
e−λ˜sask ≤
∑T
t=0 e
−ρ˜tEPW˜0
[
e−λ˜∗(W˜t−W˜t−1)t−λ˜W˜t
]
∑T
t=0 e−ρ˜tE
PW˜×Pa
0
[
e−λ˜∗(W˜t−W˜t−1)t−λ˜(W˜t−at)
]
−λ˜sask ≤ ln
∑T
t=0 e
−ρ˜tEPW˜0
[
e−λ˜∗(W˜t−W˜t−1)t−λ˜W˜t
]
∑T
t=0 e−ρ˜tE
PW˜×Pa
0
[
e−λ˜∗(W˜t−W˜t−1)t−λ˜(W˜t−at)
]
sask ≥ 1
λ˜
(
ln
T∑
t=0
e−ρ˜tEPW˜×Pa0
[
e−λ˜W˜t(1+t)+λ˜W˜t−1t+λ˜at
]
− ln
T∑
t=0
e−ρ˜tEPW˜0
[
e−λ˜W˜t(1+t)+λ˜W˜t−1t
])
,
which gives the minimum price the seller is willing to receive for the swap.
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From the buyer’s side:
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which gives the maximum price the buyer is willing to pay for the swap. 
A.2. Proof of proposition 4.1.
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A.3. Proof of proposition 4.2.
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SOLIDARITY GROUP LENDING AND GLOBAL GAMES
MIRET PADOVANI
Abstract. I study microfinance solidarity group lending within a global game
framework. Group members invest independently in either a safe or a risky
project. Ex ante observation and coordination on the choice of projects is not
always possible. Though risky projects allow microentrepreneurs to extract
risk premia, safe projects raise the probability of success of the group loan,
in which case group members benefit from access to business support services
provided by the microfinance institution. I show how borrowers’ perception
of the strength of social cohesion within the microentrepreneurial community
induces coordination on safe project choices.
1. Introduction
Solidarity group lending has been a pillar of microfinance ever since its introduc-
tion in Bangladesh in the seventies by Muhammad Yunus, founder of the Grameen
Bank. Roughly half of the 480 microfinance institutions (MFIs) covered by the
2007 MixMarket MFI Benchmarks dataset1 use a mix of solidarity and individual
lending, while 27 MFIs lend exclusively through the solidarity group method.2
The critical feature of solidarity group loans is the joint liability of all group
members. The seminal group lending scheme is that of the Grameen Bank. This
scheme has been adopted by other MFIs, though sometimes with a couple of differ-
ing features. In a Grameen-style loan a candidate borrower must form a group with
other four people. In what is known as the 2:2:1 staggering scheme, two members
of the group originally receive a loan, and if they do well, other two then receive
loans, and, finally, so does the group chairperson. The borrowers are encouraged
to assist each other, and all loan disbursements and repayments are made publicly
at a weekly meeting. Loans are typically given out for one year, at a relatively
high fixed interest rate, and are always for modest amounts: no more than a few
hundred dollars. The borrowers use the loans to make small capital investments,
Date: First version: January 2010. This version: February 18, 2010.
Key words and phrases. Solidarity group lending; microfinance; global games; social cohesion.
I am highly indebted to Hyun Song Shin for many discussions and helpful comments throughout
the writing of this paper. Special thanks also to Paolo Vanini for invaluable comments on an earlier
draft of this paper.
1See www.mixmarket.org.
2Solidarity group lending needs to be distinguished from village banking, which I do not consider
in this paper. There are a few major differences between the two lending schemes. First of all,
village banking does not apply to self-formed groups; rather, individuals typically arrive on their
own and are placed on a waiting list until a desired number of borrowers is reached. Second,
village banking groups are composed of a much higher number of members: up to 40 rather than
5 or 6. A third and crucial difference is that village banking does not impose joint liability among
members, although members are encouraged to supervise each other, e.g. by visiting a person in
default and inquiring as to the cause of default or late repayment.
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e.g. for the production of bakery goods. Once all group members have repaid the
initial loan, they are allowed to apply for new ones.
As microentrepreneurs typically lack physical collateral which they can pledge
against the loans they receive, MFIs need to make use of collateral substitutes.
The MFI can in most settings exploit the social sanction opportunities that exist
between borrowers. Social collateral generated with group formation and imposition
of joint responsibility at the group level may be deemed as an effective substitute
for conventional creditworthiness. As such, social collateral offers a guarantee for
loan repayment and minimizes potential loan defaults.
Social sanctions may take several forms. Defecting borrowers may be excluded
from privileged access to input supplies, from further trade credit, from social and
religious events, or from day-to-day courtesies. The threat of such sanctions is more
credible the smaller the village community.3 Indeed, the strength of social sanctions
mirrors the strength of social cohesion, i.e. the network of social relationships
binding people together in communities and neighborhoods.
It is hard to give a precise definition of social collateral, given its multiple facets.
Nevertheless, it is worthy to note at this stage the distinction made in the sociology
literature between social capital and social cohesion, both of which constitute a
type of social collateral:
“Social capital is a characteristic of the individual, defined as the
current sacrifice in time, effort, or money made by that individual
in the hope of promoting productive cooperation or coordination
with others (Osberg [Osb03]).”
On the other hand,
“Social cohesion is a characteristic of the society or collective that
depends on the history of the accumulation of social capital in the
group and which, in turn, affects the incentives for current social
capital investments (Osberg [Osb03]).”
Both aspects of social collateral are crucial for the success of microfinance: social
capital determines the creditworthiness of individual borrowers, social cohesion that
of an entire group of borrowers. My interest in this paper focusses on the latter.4
The importance of social collateral in financial transactions is not confined to
microfinance, but also applies to the more general case of financial transactions
among friends and acquaintances: interest rates may be low or even zero, but
social costs and obligations are often considerable.
Empirical studies give, however, a mixed picture concerning the extent to which
social cohesion affects the performance of group lending. Differences in results
sometimes seem to depend on the proxy used. Wydick [Wyd99] shows that groups
of strangers can do as well as groups of friends - if not even better. Social ties per
se have little impact on the performance of borrowing groups. What really matter
are peer monitoring and group pressure. Peer monitoring denotes the ability of
borrowers to monitor the investment behavior of another during the course of the
loan, making sure that each group member undertakes only safe investment projects
with borrowed capital; whereas, group pressure denotes the ability to threaten
3See discussion in Armendariz and Morduch [AM05].
4Osberg [Osb03] analyzes the economic implications of social cohesion. This field of research
is concerned with the question of whether differences in trust, social capital, social cohesion can
explain differences in the economic performance of world regions. See also Dayton-Johnson [DJ01].
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exclusion of non-paying members from continued access to credit. Since friends
may be softer and more forgiving on each other, it is not necessarily true that
stronger social ties lead to higher repayment rates.
On the other hand, subsequent field experiments conducted in several devel-
oping countries by the same author,5 as well as research by Gomez and Santor
[GS03] demonstrate that the strength and credibility of the threat of social sanc-
tions against defaulting members is the key determinant in group loan performance.
While the inspiration for my work lies in the literature on the role of social
sanctions in group-based lending schemes,6 the modeling framework is related to the
literature on coordination in global games. Global games are games with incomplete
information regarding both the fundamental state of the world and the actions taken
by other players. They have first been studied by Carlsson and van Damme [CvD93]
and later on extended by Morris and Shin [MS03] to study financial crises and bank
runs. The question I ultimately want to answer is whether private beliefs concerning
the strength of social cohesion within the microentrepreneurial community induce
group loan members to act in the interest of the entire group rather than in their
own self-interest.
To the best of my knowledge, there has been only one application of global games
to microfinance lending by Bond and Rai [BR09]. Although their theoretical idea
is the same as mine, i.e. the authors study a borrower’s motivation to pay back
in a solidarity group loan within a global game framework, there are at least two
substantial differences. First of all, in their game, players choose between paying
back a loan or not, rather than between investing in a safe or a risky project. So also
the definition of the game’s payoffs and the subsequent analysis differ substantially.
More crucially, the motivation behind Bond and Rai’s [BR09] paper is different than
mine: their focus lies in finding the optimal contract from an MFI’s perspective,
whereas my focus lies in studying the role of social cohesion in a global games
framework.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes
joint liability microfinance games - in the setting they are most typically carried
out in laboratory experiments. The following section outlines the benchmark global
game modeling framework for a 2-player game, where each microentrepreneur takes
an investment decision under uncertainty regarding the action of the other group
member (‘strategic uncertainty’). Sections 4 to 5 extend the benchmark model to
3-player and (n + 1)-player games, respectively. Section 6 introduces uncertainty
regarding the strength of social cohesion (‘fundamental uncertainty’), thus leading
to a ‘private values’ global game. Sections 7 to 8 apply the ‘private values’ model to
3-player and (n+ 1)-player games, respectively. Section 9 discusses the economics
behind my results. Section 10 concludes.
2. Joint liability microfinance games
Several researchers have undertaken laboratory experiments, where they simulate
microfinance games in an attempt to identify the key factors to higher repayment
rates. Despite the disadvantage of proceeding in a deliberately artificial setting,
lab experiments have the advantage of being able to keep all features of the game
constant from one round to the other, while only varying the parameters that
5See Cassar et al. [CCW07], Cassar and Wydick [CW09], and Wydick et al. [WHK09].
6See Karlan [Kar07], Karlan et al. [KMRS09], and Ambrus et al. [AMS08].
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are to be tested for. For the purposes of my study, I outline microfinance games
similar to the joint liability experiments conducted by Gine et al. [GJKM06] in
the Philippines. The games are inspired by Stiglitz’ [Sti90] model of ex ante moral
hazard in microfinance and are designed to capture the most relevant features of
microfinance loans, namely peer insurance and social costs to individual default.
Although Gine et al. [GJKM06] consider two-player partnerships, their discussion
can be extended to n-player partnerships.
Consider a joint liability group composed of n borrowers. Each group member is
given a loan with face value L and can undertake one of two projects: either a safe
project, yielding YS for sure (i.e. with probability of success piS = 1), or a risky
project, yielding YR > YS with probability of success piR < 1 and 0 otherwise. A
borrower has to repay her loan only if her project is successful; she may not use
wealth from prior investments to repay the current investment’s loan.
The success of borrowers’ projects are independent. If all partners choose safe
investments, then the outcome of the game is identical to that of an individual
liability game: Each borrower receives YS and pays back her loan; no borrower has
to compensate the MFI for any defaulting group member.
Another possible situation is when safe investors are matched with risk-taking
borrowers; then the safe investors can be expected to bail out their partners. Each
safe investor receives YS , but in addition to repaying her loan, she must also compen-
sate the MFI for the shortfall due to any defaulting risk-taking member. Successful
risk-taking borrowers, too, must contribute in bailing out their defaulting peers.
Group default is more likely to occur if too many investors invest in risky projects.
This is because the likelihood of project failures rises and so does the likelihood
that not enough borrowers can compensate the MFI for too big a shortfall.
Borrowers do not communicate their investment choices and ex ante observation
of investment choices is not possible. This assumption begs the question of whether
ex ante observation is truly never possible in microfinance investments, or only
sometimes. Though the nature of the business may very well be observable (e.g.
producing scarves), the suppliers, for example, may not be. So supplying to a
customer known to be risky, e.g. because paying in an unstable or weak currency,
or having poor businesses themselves, or likely to ‘run away with the money’, can be
interpreted as undertaking a risky investment. W.l.o.g. assume ex post observation
of risky or safe investment choices occurs at the time when the loan is due back to
the MFI. If it is revealed that individual j had engaged in risky transactions, then
the other group members and/or society can impose on j a social sanction c, which
represents the (common) cost of deviating from the social optimum.
Three major results of Gine et al. [GJKM06] are particularly worthy of note.
First of all, adding an opportunity for ex post punishment in the dynamic moni-
toring game does not alter the average repayment rate. So the standard dynamic
game results seem not to be that useful in explaining the high repayment rates in
solidarity group lending. Second, endogenous partner choice has a big effect on con-
tract performance. This is a key property suggesting that social sanctions play an
important role. A third result is that the best predictor of partner choice is having
been a host or guest of the partner in real life. Together with the previous result,
this suggests that coordination is better achieved when playing with someone the
microentrepreneur knows well, and against whom she has other social relationships.
SOLIDARITY GROUP LENDING AND GLOBAL GAMES 5
Remark 2.1 (On expected returns). In Stiglitz’ [Sti90] original model, the safe(r)
project is assumed to deliver a higher expected return than the riskier project, i.e.
YS − (1 + r)L ≥ piR [YR − (1 + r)L] .
But this assumption is implausible. An investor who desires a higher expected
return on her investments should be willing to undertake higher risk. Vice versa,
risk-averse investors need to be rewarded for undertaking undiversifiable, systematic
risk. The expected return on a risky investment is then equal to the sure return on
a risk-free investment plus a risk premium.
3. A 2-borrower group example
I analyze the joint liability microfinance game in a global game setting. Each
borrower faces strategic uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty over the actions of the other
players. More specifically, strategic uncertainty is the uncertainty over how many
group members will undertake risky or safe projects. From the perspective of
borrower i, a critical number k∗ of her peers need to invest their funds safely, so
that the group loan is successful. In case of success of the group loan, all group
members have access to MFI business support services and are entitled to apply
for new loans in the future, if they decide to do so. To start with, consider the
case where social cost c is common knowledge among all borrowers. So there is no
fundamental uncertainty, which I will instead introduce at a later stage. Also start
with 2 borrowers, i and j.
As I will illustrate throughout the next sections, the incentive of choosing a
safe project for borrower i is increasing in the number of her peers also choosing
the safe investment: with a lower number of possibly defaulting risky projects,
a safe-investing borrower faces a lower risk of having to bail out her peers and
therefore has a higher expected payoff on her investment. Thus there are strategic
complementarities between microentrepreneurs’ investment choices.
The only non-trivial case in the two-player game is when both investors need
to invest in a safe project for the group loan to be successful, otherwise the game
gives rise to a free-riding problem. The payoff matrix for k∗ = 2 is given in table
3.1 with the following notation:
(A;α) = (Πi,S ; Πj,S) =
(
YS − (1 + r)L+ Z; YS − (1 + r)L+ Z
)
;
(B;β) = (Πi,R; Πj,S) = (pii,R (YR − (1 + r)L)− c; YS − (1 + r)L) ;
(C; γ) = (Πi,S ; Πj,R) = (YS − (1 + r)L; pij,R (YR − (1 + r)L)− c) ;
(D; δ) = (Πi,R; Πj,R) = (pii,R (YR − (1 + r)L)− c; pij,R (YR − (1 + r)L)− c) .
i; j S R
S (A;α) (C; γ)
R (B;β) (D; δ)
Table 3.1. Two-action, two-player game payoff matrix
The term Z denotes the payoff a borrower gets from the group loan being suc-
cessful. That is, Z is the value a microentrepreneur assigns to the business services
the MFI provides its clients with. We may also think of Z more broadly: Z would
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then include both monetary benefits, such as future loan amounts, as well as non-
monetary benefits, such as having access to business services provided by the MFI,
not going through the hassle of looking for a new group, being confident enough that
there will be continuous funding for the started investment, and so on. The param-
eter Z can actually take on two values, according to whether the borrower invests
safely or not: a higher-valued Z and a lower-valued Z. Good borrowers can expect
to extract the maximum benefits from the MFI’s services; hence, Z. Whereas, bor-
rowers with an imperfect credit record have limited access to an MFI’s services, so
that a deduction in offered services, i.e. Z − Z, can be interpreted as a ‘sanction’
from the MFI. Note, however, that in this specific example with two borrowers,
only Z comes into the picture. It will result from the following discussion that the
value Z of the MFI’s services influences the behavior of group members and is,
therefore, of crucial importance in determining the outcome of the group loan.
Note that this game differs from the prisoners’ dilemma, where the players have
a dominant action not to cooperate. Here, we have multiple equilibria and the good
outcome is also an equilibrium. From the entire group’s perspective it is better to
invest in safer projects so not to jeopardize the group loan. Riskier projects do
enable individual members to enjoy some private benefits in case of success, but
lower the verifiable payoff for the group, hence putting the group loan at too high
a risk of interruption. The risk premium captures, therefore, the tension between
the socially desirable outcome and the outcome resulting from the self-interested
action of group members.
I simplify the notation in the remainder of the paper as follows.
• E [YR] = piR (YR − (1 + r)L), the expected return on the risky project -
after paying back the loan principal plus interest;
• YS = YS − (1 + r)L, the sure return on the safe project - after paying back
the loan principal plus interest;
• E [λx], the maximum expected compensation due to the lender if any or all
of borrower i’s x risk-taking peers default;
• P = E [YR]− YS , the gross risk premium;
• p = P − c, the risk premium net of social sanctions;
• Z − Z = z, the extra benefit from MFI services.
“Both invest in safe projects” is the dominant equilibrium when c is large enough
that
A > B; C > D
for borrower i and
α > γ; β > δ
for borrower j. That is, when c is such that both
YS + Z > E [YR]− c
and
YS > E [YR]− c
hold. So when
c > E [YR]− YS ,
i.e. when c is larger than the risk premium, then defecting from the social optimum
is never rewarding and it is a dominant strategy for both borrowers to go for the safe
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project. Put differently: When social sanctions lead to a negative risk premium,
i.e.
E [YR]− YS − c < 0 ⇒ p < 0,
then both microentrepreneurs invest in safe projects.
“Both invest in risky projects” is the dominant equilibrium when c is small
enough that
B > A; D > C
for borrower i and
γ > α; δ > β
for borrower j. That is, when c is such that both
E [YR]− c > YS + Z
and
E [YR]− c > YS
hold. So when
c < E [YR]− YS + Z,
i.e. when c is smaller than the difference between the risk premium and the value
of MFI services, then cooperating towards the social optimum is never rewarding
and it is a dominant strategy for borrower i to go for the risky project. Put
differently: When social sanctions do not lower the risk premium below the value
of MFI services, i.e.
E [YR]− YS − c > Z ⇒ p < Z,
then both microentrepreneurs invest in risky projects.
There are multiple equilibria when it holds that
A > B; D > C
for borrower i and
α > γ; δ > β
for borrower j. That is, when c is such that both
YS + Z ≥ E [YR]− c
and
E [YR]− c ≥ YS
hold. Then the risk premium net of social sanctions lies somewhere within the
interval [0, Z]. The equilibria are Pareto-rankable when A > D, or
YS + Z ≥ E [YR]− c,
so that it would be in both microentrepreneurs’ interest to coordinate on under-
taking safe investments. A coordination failure arises when the Pareto-superior
equilibrium fails to be selected.
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4. A 3-borrower group example
A transition example from the 2-player game to the (n+1)-player game will allow
us to further clarify our setting, as the number of group members increases. Let us
take a group of three borrowers. Borrower i has n = 2 peers, j and l. Assume it
is essential that at least two borrowers invest in a safe project for the group loan
to be successful. Say borrower i decides to invest in a safe project, then at least
k∗ = 1 of her peers must invest in a safe project, too, if the group loan were to be
successful. I will assume throughout the paper that all borrowers’ risky projects
carry the same probability of success; hence, in this example, pii,R = pij,R = pil,R.
The expected payoff for borrower i if investing in a safe project is given by the
following.
• Payoff if k = 2, i.e. if both her peers invest safely and the group loan is
successful, since k ≥ k∗:
Πi,S = YS + Z.
• Payoff if k = 1, i.e. if also another of her peers invests safely and the group
loan is successful, since k ≥ k∗:
Πi,S = YS − E [λ1] + Z.
If the risk-taking borrower is unsuccessful, then borrower i, together with
the other safe borrower, needs to compensate the lender for an amount not
higher than λ1. However, since the loan is nevertheless successful, borrower
i receives benefit Z.
• Payoff if k = 0, i.e. if no other borrower invests safely and the group loan
fails, since k < k∗:
Πi,S = YS .
The expected payoff for borrower i if investing in a risky project is given by the
following.
• Payoff if k = 2, i.e. if both her peers invest safely and the group loan is
successful, since k ≥ k∗:
Πi,R = E [YR]− c+ Z.
• Payoff if k = 1, i.e. if only one of her peers invests safely and the group
loan fails, since k < k∗:
Πi,R = E [YR]− c.
• Payoff if k = 0, i.e. if none of her peers invest safely and the group loan
fails, since k < k∗:
Πi,R = E [YR]− c.
We are assuming that a borrower investing in a risky project faces social sanctions
even if her project proves out to be successful. It will, indeed, be revealed to other
villagers that she had acted egoistically and she would be considered from thereon
an untrustworthy business partner.
See the summarizing payoff matrix 4.1 where I make use of the following notation:
• A = E [YR]− c+ Z
• B = E [YR]− c
• C = YS + Z
• D = YS − E [λ1] + Z
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(i; j; l)
SSS (C; C; C)
SRS (D; A; D)
SSR (D; D; A)
SRR (E; B; B)
RSS (A; D; D)
RRS (B; B; E)
RSR (B; E; B)
RRR (B; B; B)
Table 4.1. Two-action, three-player game payoffs
• E = YS
Section A in the appendix reports detailed payoffs.
“All invest in safe projects” is the dominant equilibrium when c is large enough
such that
C > A; D > B; E > B
hold for each borrower. That is, when c is such that
YS + Z > E [YR]− c+ Z,
YS − E [λ1] + Z > E [YR]− c,
and
YS > E [YR]− c
hold. So when
c > E [YR]− YS ⇒ p < 0,
i.e. when the risk premium net of social sanctions is negative, defecting from the
social optimum is never rewarding and it is a dominant strategy for all borrowers
to go for the safe project.
“All invest in risky projects” is the dominant equilibrium when c is small enough
such that
A > C; B > D; B > E
hold for each borrower. That is, when c is such that
E [YR]− c+ Z > YS + Z,
E [YR]− c > YS − E [λ1] + Z,
and
E [YR]− c > YS − (1 + r)L
hold. So when
c < E [YR]−
[
YS − E [λ1] + Z
] ⇒ p > Z − E [λ1]
i.e. when the risk premium net of social sanctions is larger than the difference
between the value of MFI services and the expected compensation due to the MFI
in case of peers’ default, cooperating towards the social optimum is never rewarding
and it is a dominant strategy for all borrowers to go for the risky project.
There are multiple equilibria when it holds that
C > A; D > B; B > E
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(i; j; l)
SSS (C; C; C)
SRS (D; A; D)
SSR (D; D; A)
SRR (E; B; B)
RSS (A; D; D)
RRS (B; B; E)
RSR (B; E; B)
RRR (B; B; B)
Table 4.2. Multiple equilibria in the two-action, three-player
game payoffs: SSS and RRR.
for all borrowers. That is, when c is such that
YS + Z ≥ E [YR]− c
and
E [YR]− c ≥ YS
hold. Then the risk premium net of social sanctions lies somewhere within the
interval [0, z]. The equilibria are Pareto-rankable when C > B, or
YS + Z > E [YR]− c,
so that it would be in both microentrepreneurs’ interest to coordinate on safe in-
vestments. Once again, a coordination failure arises when the Pareto-superior equi-
librium fails to be selected.
5. An (n+ 1)-borrower group example
Having analyzed in detail the 3-borrower case, we may generalize the framework
to the case where borrower i takes a loan with n peers. The payoff matrix contains
2n+1 entries for all possible combinations.
The payoff for borrower i when opting for a safe project is
Πi,S = YS − E [λn−k] + Z,
if k ≥ k∗, and
Πi,S = YS ,
if k < k∗.
Her payoff when opting for a risky project is
Πi,R = E [YR]− E [λn−k]− c+ Z,
if k > k∗, and
Πi,R = E [YR]− c,
if k ≤ k∗.
Figure 5.1 illustrates all possible payoffs. The expected payoff (and also the
incentive of choosing a safe project) is increasing in the number of other players
also choosing the safe investment: with a lower number of possibly defaulting risky
projects, a safe-investing borrower faces a lower risk of having to bail out her peers
and therefore has a higher expected payoff on her investment. Thus there are
strategic complementarities between microentrepreneurs’ investment choices.
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Figure 5.1. Visualization of the payoff for borrower i in an (n+1)-
borrower game.
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“All invest in safe projects” is the dominant equilibrium when
E [YR] + Z − c < YS + Z
E [YR] + Z − E [λ1]− c < YS + Z − E [λ1]
... <
...
E [YR] + Z − E [λn−k∗−2]− c < YS + Z − E [λn−k∗−2]
E [YR] + Z − E [λn−k∗−1]− c < YS + Z − E [λn−k∗−1]
E [YR]− c < YS + Z − E [λn−k∗ ]
E [YR]− c < YS .
It is reasonable to believe that an MFI would not impose on a successful borrower
to pay a compensation amount λ higher than the value Z of its own services. So
the maximal possible compensation amount must satisfy E [λn−k∗ ] ≤ Z; we may
take, for simplicity,
(5.1) E [λn−k∗ ] = Z.
Remark 5.1. Under assumption (5.1), borrower i receives the same payoff both in
case the group loan is successful with k∗ peers (but not herself) investing in a safe
project and in case the group loan is unsuccessful. Indeed, E [YR]+Z−E [λn−k∗ ]−
c = E [YR]− c.
From the payoffs above, we get
c > P,
or
p < 0.
So when social sanctions are larger than the gross risk premium, the net risk pre-
mium is negative and it is a dominant strategy for all borrowers to invest in a safe
project.
Similarly, “All invest in risky projects” is the dominant equilibrium when
E [YR] + Z − c > YS + Z
E [YR] + Z − E [λ1]− c > YS + Z − E [λ1]
... >
...
E [YR] + Z − E [λn−k∗−2]− c > YS + Z − E [λn−k∗−2]
E [YR] + Z − E [λn−k∗−1]− c > YS + Z − E [λn−k∗−1]
E [YR]− c > YS + Z − E [λn−k∗ ]
E [YR]− c > YS .
Therefore,
c < P − Z + Z,
or
p > z.
So when social sanctions are smaller than the difference between the gross risk
premium and the extra value of MFI services, then the net risk premium is larger
than z and it is a dominant strategy for all borrowers to invest in a risky project.
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Multiple equilibria arise when borrower i receives a higher payoff if investing in
the safe project when exactly k∗ or more of her peers do so too, but receives a
higher payoff if investing in the risky project when less than k∗ of her peers invest
in the safe project.
E [YR] + Z − c < YS + Z
E [YR] + Z − E [λ1]− c < YS + Z − E [λ1]
... >
...
E [YR] + Z − E [λn−k∗−2]− c < YS + Z − E [λn−k∗−2]
E [YR] + Z − E [λn−k∗−1]− c < YS + Z − E [λn−k∗−1]
E [YR]− c < YS + Z − E [λn−k∗ ]
E [YR]− c > YS
Therefore,
P − Z + Z < c < P ;
or
0 < p < z.
So here the net risk premium takes a value between zero and the extra benefit
of MFI services and two strict equilibria arise: either all borrowers invest in safe
projects or all invest in risky projects.
In case of flexible group lending, the amount λ that a successful microentrepreneur
owes for her defaulting partners is optimally determined.7
5.1. Summarizing. Each microentrepreneur has the choice between investing in a
safe project with sure return YS or investing in a risky project with expected return
E [YR]. Ignoring social sanctions for a moment, the risk premium, E [YR] − YS , is
smallest when - in case of group loan success - a safe borrower does not have to
compensate the lender for the default of any of her peers; it is largest when a safe
borrower has to compensate the lender for the default of all n − k∗ risk-taking
borrowers. Hence, premia are smaller for group loans requiring a larger k∗. This is
indicative of a negative relationship between p∗ and k∗.
When social sanctions come into the picture, they erode the risk premium and
make risky projects less attractive to microentrepreneurs. This highlights the trade-
off microentrepreneurs face when taking on a joint-liability loan. On the one side,
they are aware of the benefits of risk-taking for their profits as well as for the local
economy. On the other side, they are also aware of the social sanctions they face if
their peers view them as selfish or otherwise unreliable business partners.
The 2-, 3-, and (n+1)-players games have all shown us that, when social cohesion
is common knowledge among all group members, there is a potential for multiple
equilibria:
• For c < P − Z + Z (hence, p > z), the group loan is interrupted, since
social sanctions are so low (read: social cohesion is so weak) that they do
not erode even the smallest possible risk premium. Borrowers will find it
more profitable to try and extract private benefits rather than invest too
safely for the benefit of the group. Defecting from the social optimum is
7See Bohle and Ogden [BO09] for a discussion on social sanctions and flexible group lending.
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always rewarding and it is a dominant strategy for borrower i to go for the
risky project.
• For c > P (hence, p < 0), the group loan is kept alive, since social sanctions
are so high (read: social cohesion is so strong) that they would even erode
the largest possible risk premium. Borrowers do not find it profitable to try
and deviate from the social optimum. Defecting from the social optimum
is never rewarding and it is a dominant strategy for borrower i to go for
the safe project.
• For P − Z + Z < c < P (hence, 0 < p < z), the group loan is at risk of
being interrupted. For each p ∈ (0, z), there are two strict equilibria: “All
invest in safe projects” and “All invest in risky projects”. Though the lat-
ter equilibrium allows individual borrowers to extract private benefits, the
former is superior from the entire group’s perspective. Which equilibrium
will emerge depends on the aggregate investment choices of the borrowers.
Cooperating towards the socially desirable outcome is rewarding for bor-
rower i if and only if at least k∗ of her peers go for the safe project. Hence,
there arises a coordination problem among all borrowers where the beliefs
of borrower i over the investment choices of her peers play an important
role.
6. Private values global game
At this stage I introduce fundamental uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty over the
true social cohesion within the community of microentrepreneurs. To capture this
uncertainty, assume that the strength of social sanctions, c, is no longer common
knowledge to all borrowers, but is instead heterogeneously perceived across the
population. This also leads to the risk premium being heterogeneously perceived.
Each borrower’s perception of the risk premium, pi, is composed of two terms:
a uniformly distributed population-wide term, θ, and an idiosyncratic term, si.
Hence,
pi = θ + si,
where si is i.i.d. with uniform distribution over [−, ], for small  > 0. Plus, si
and sj are independent for i 6= j. Borrower i knows pi, but cannot distinguish the
θ and si; so pi is a noisy signal.
Note that differences in risk premia is a realistic assumption, given that in reality
different risky projects will have different probabilities of success.
Definition 6.1 (Strategy). A strategy is a function specifying an action for each
possible private signal. Borrower i’s investment decision must be conditional on
her own risk premium, pi, rather than on θ. Hence, a strategy is a mapping
pi 7→ {Safe,Risk}
and the optimal choice of action for borrower i will depend on the probability she
attaches to k exceeding the critical threshold k∗.
Definition 6.2 (Equilibrium). On observing her own risk premium, borrower i
reasons her way towards the probability density over k. An equilibrium sets in
when each borrower invests in the project that is a best response to her beliefs over
the number of her peers investing in either a safe or a risky project.
As I will show in the following sections, in a global game setting, if players have
only private information, there is a unique equilibrium where each borrower invests
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in the project that is a best response to a uniform belief over the number k of her
peers investing in a safe project. Thus, when faced with some information concern-
ing the underlying social cohesion, the prescription for each microentrepreneur is
to hypothesize that the number of her peers who will opt for a safe investment is a
random variable that is uniformly distributed over the unit interval and choose the
best action under these circumstances.
As a first step, restrict attention to switching strategies.
Definition 6.3 (Switching strategy). When following a switching strategy around
p∗, a borrower invests in a risky project if pi ≥ p∗ and invests in a safe project if
pi < p
∗.
Definition 6.4 (Failure point). Failure point k∗ is the threshold value of k below
which the group loan just fails. Failure point k∗ depends on switching point p∗ and
vice versa.
Suppose all players use switching strategy around p∗ and that borrower i’s risk
premium happens to be exactly p∗. We will derive borrower i’s subjective density
over the number of group members who make a safe investment choice. That
is, borrower i asks herself: “My risk premium is p∗, what is the probability that
exactly m out of my n peers will go for a safe project?” Morris and Shin [MS03]
show that the answer to this question turns out to be 1n+1 , irrespective of m. I.e.
the probability mass function over the number of players who invest in a safe project
is that of a discrete uniform distribution with support {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}.8
For completeness of the discussion, I reproduce here the proof of discretely and
uniformly distributed beliefs from Morris and Shin [MS03], adapting it to the con-
text at hand.
Proposition 6.5. The probability mass function over the number of peers investing
in a safe project is that of a discrete uniform distribution with support {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}
- conditional on being at the switching point in a switching strategy.
Proof. Consider figures 6.1 and 6.2. When the common component of the risk
premium is θ, the individual risk premia are distributed uniformly over the interval
[θ − , θ + ]. The microentrepreneurs who invest in a safe project are those whose
risk premia are below p∗. The probability that a borrower’s risk premium is below
p∗ (and will therefore invest safely) is given by the area under the density to the
left of p∗. This area is given by9
(6.1) z =
p∗ − θ + 
2
.
Thus, the probability that exactly m out of all n peers will go for a safe project is
the binomial probability10 (
n
m
)
zm(1− z)n−m,
8The discrete uniform distribution is also known as the ‘equally likely outcomes’ distribution and
has cumulative distribution function j/n for j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
9The probability density function for a continuous uniform distribution on the interval [a, b] is
P (x) = 1/(b− a) for a ≤ x ≤ b.
10Note the conditions that need to be met for the binomial distribution to hold. (i) Each project
choice (‘trial’) has only two possible outcomes: choice of safe project (‘success’) or risky project
(‘failure’); (ii) The probability of choice of a safe project is known and does not vary - here 0.5;
(iii) The number of project choices, m, is fixed; (iv) Each project choice is independent.
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Figure 6.1. Deriving the cumulative distribution function
G (k∗|p∗). Number of borrower i’s peers whose risk premia lie
below p∗.
Figure 6.2. Deriving the cumulative distribution function
G (k∗|p∗). Borrower i’s posterior density over θ conditional on
her risk premium being p∗.
or, substituting,
(6.2)
(
n
m
)
(p∗ − θ + )m (−p∗ + θ + )n−m
(2)n
.
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We have k < z if and only if θ > θ∗. Thus, to answer the question above we need to
find the probability that θ > θ∗. We need the posterior density over θ conditional
on p∗. This is uniform over
[p∗ − , p∗ + ],
since the ex ante distribution is uniform and the idiosyncratic element of the risk
premium is uniformly distributed around θ. Then
(6.3)
(
n
m
)
2
∫ p∗+
p∗−
(p∗ − θ + )m (−p∗ + θ + )n−m
(2)n
dθ.
We can simplify this expression by taking the change of variables in (6.1). Then
dθ = 2dz, while the lower and upper limits of the integral become 0 and 1,
respectively. Then (6.3) can be rewritten as
(6.4)
(
n
m
)∫ 1
0
zm(1− z)n−m dz.
Appendix 6.4 proves that this integral does not depend on m and is equal to 1n+1 .

From the proof above we get that the density over the number of peers who invest
in a safe project is uniform, conditional on being at the switching point in a switch-
ing strategy. Plus, the expression does not depend on . Hence, as Morris and Shin
[MS02] [MS03] demonstrate: as → 0, the uncertainty concerning c dissipates, but
the uncertainty over k still remains. That is, even if the underlying fundamentals of
the problem were known for sure, strategic uncertainty would still be very severe.
The authors also show that this result is not restricted to the uniform-uniform case,
but also applies under the assumption of normally-distributed θ and .
Now consider the reasoning of the borrowers. At switching point p∗, borrower i
is indifferent between the risky investment and the safe investment. Recall (5.1);
in this case,
E [λ1] = Z.
The payoff for borrower i in case of group loan failure is independent of how
many among her peers opt for a safe project: it is either YS , if she goes for a safe
project, or E [YR] − c, if she goes for a risky project. Therefore, we may consider
Pr (k < k∗). On the other hand, the payoff she gets in case of group loan success
varies with the number of other borrowers investing in a safe project. Therefore,
we need to consider
n−1∑
j=k∗
Pr (k = j) .
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It follows that
Pr (k = 2|p∗)× (YS + Z)+ Pr (k = 1|p∗)× (YS − E [λ1] + Z)
+Pr (k = 0|p∗)× YS
= Pr (k = 2|p∗)× (E [YR]− c∗ + Z) + Pr (k = 1|p∗)× (E [YR]− c∗)
+Pr (k = 0|p∗)× (E [YR]− c∗) ,
or
Pr (k = 2|p∗)× (YS + Z)+ Pr (k = 1|p∗)× (YS − E [λ1] + Z)
+Pr (k < 1|p∗)× YS
= Pr (k = 2|p∗)× (E [YR]− c∗ + Z) + Pr (k = 1|p∗)× (E [YR]− c∗)
+Pr (k < 1|p∗)× (E [YR]− c∗) ,
or
Pr (k = 2|p∗)× (YS + Z)+ Pr (k = 1|c∗)× (YS − E [λ1] + Z)
+G (k∗|p∗)× YS
= Pr (k = 2|p∗)× (E [YR]− c∗ + Z) + Pr (k = 1|p∗)× (E [YR]− c∗)
+G (k∗|p∗)× (E [YR]− c∗) ,
where G (k∗|p∗) denotes the cumulative distribution function over the number of
borrowers who go for a safe project, conditional on p∗, evaluated at k∗ = 1.
7. The 3-borrower group example continued
In the 3-borrower example, the probability of 0, 1, or 2 among borrower i’s n
peers investing in a safe project, conditional on p∗, is invariably 1 = (n+1) = 1/3;
and G = k∗/(n+ 1) = 1/3. We may solve the expression above for c∗:
(7.1) c∗ = E [YR]− YS − 2Z − Z − E [λ1]2 + k∗
With Z = E [λ1], the switching equilibrium is given by
(7.2) p∗ =
2z
2 + k∗
.
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Figure 7.1. Switching strategy p∗ as a function of critical thresh-
old k∗, for fixed z. The 3-borrower group example.
It results that the threshold point of the switching strategy, p∗, is a decreasing
function of the critical threshold k∗. For fixed z, figure 7.1 shows how the switching
strategy (as a function of z) changes as the critical threshold changes. For the 3-
borrower case, we get values (0, z),
(
1, 23z
)
, and
(
2, 12z
)
in the (k∗, p∗)-space.
7.1. Proof of uniqueness of equilibrium. As borrowers’ payoffs satisfy strategic
complementarity, uniqueness of the switching equilibrium p∗ can be proved by the
iterated elimination of dominated strategies from below and above p∗. I here only
give a sketch of the proof and refer the reader to Morris and Shin [MS03] for a
detailed proof.
Take equation (6.1). Then for pi lower then the switching strategy p∗, the
probability that fewer then k∗ peers will go for a safe project decreases. So enough
borrowers believe social sanctions are high enough to erode risk premia. This
reinforces the idea that borrower i should indeed invest in the safe project, given
that her net risk premium is lower than the switching equilibrium.
Say, instead, borrower i has a risk premium higher than the switching value, i.e.
pi > p
∗, then the probability that fewer then k∗ peers will go for a safe project
increases. As an increasing number of peers is expected to opt for a risky project,
it becomes ever more attractive for borrower i to go for a risky project herself.
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8. The (n+ 1)-borrower group example continued
For p∗, borrower i is indifferent between the risky investment and the safe in-
vestment, so that
Pr (k = 0|p∗)Πi,S + . . .+ Pr (k = k∗|p∗)Πi,S + . . .+ Pr (k = n|p∗)Πi,S
= Pr (k = 0|p∗)Πi,R + . . .+ Pr (k = k∗|p∗)Πi,R + . . .+ Pr (k = n|p∗)Πi,R
or
k∗−1∑
j=0
Pr (k = j|p∗)Πi,S +G (k∗|p∗)Πi,S
=
n∑
j=k∗
Pr (k = j|p∗)Πi,R +G (k∗|p∗)Πi,R.(8.1)
Substituting the payoff expressions in (8.1) gives
n∑
j=k∗
Pr (k = j|p∗)× (YS + Z − E [λn−j ])
+G(k∗|p∗)× YS
=
n∑
j=k∗
Pr (k = j|p∗)× (E [YR] + Z − E [λn−j ]− c∗)
+G (k∗|p∗)× (E [YR]− c∗) ,
with E [λ0] = 0.
So we get
c∗ = E [YR]− YS −
(n− k∗ + 1) z −∑n−1j=k∗+1 E [λn−j ]
n+ 1
and
(8.2) p∗ =
(n− k∗ + 1) z −∑n−1j=k∗+1 E [λn−j ]
n+ 1
.
For fixed z, figure 8.1 shows how the switching strategy (as a function of z)
changes as the critical threshold changes. With n + 1 borrowers, we get val-
ues (0, z − ϕ),
(
1, nn+1z − ϕ
)
,
(
2, n−1n+1z − ϕ
)
,. . .
(
n, zn+1 − ϕ
)
in the (k∗, p∗)-space,
with ϕ =
∑n−1
j=k∗+1 E[λn−j ]
n+1 .
9. Discussion of results
Let us take the expression (8.2) for the switching equilibrium or, slightly more
detailed,
piR YR − YS + (1− piR) (1 + r)L− c∗ =
(n− k∗ + 1) z −∑n−1j=k∗ E [λn−j ]
n+ 1
,
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Figure 8.1. Switching strategy p∗ as a function of critical thresh-
old k∗, for fixed z. The (n+ 1)-borrower group example.
and analyze the effect of its various components.
For larger probability of success of risky projects, piR, social sanctions need to
be very high in order to induce coordination on safe project choices. In figure 6.2
p∗ moves further to the right, so that the grey area gets smaller, meaning there is
a smaller probability of borrowers investing in a safe project. Vice versa, take very
risky projects depending, say, on erratic climate conditions, then even small social
sanctions are likely to guarantee coordination on the safe project.
The same applies when the potential return from the risky project, YR, grows
larger. Conversely, when the sure return from the safe project, YS , increases, then
p∗ moves further to the left figure 6.2 and the grey area gets bigger, meaning there
is a larger probability of borrowers investing in a safe project.
Keeping other things equal, a higher number of group peers n raises p∗ to a value
closer to the extra benefit from MFI services z. Indeed,
p∗ = z − k
∗z +
∑n−1
j=k∗ E [λn−j ]
n+ 1
.
However, a higher n also indirectly lowers p∗ by raising the expected compensation
amount due to the lender, since more peers (n − k∗) will be undertaking risky
projects.
The compensation amount due to the lender itself, λ, too, raises p∗. That is,
a higher λ lowers the probability that borrowers will invest in the safe project.
This result may also explain why several microfinance lenders, including Muhamed
Yunus, have highlighted the disincentive effect of joint liability and have instead
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promoted flexible joint liability, where the compensation amount is optimally de-
termined in each single case.
The nominal loan amount and the interest charged on the loan matter as well.
Indeed, as L and / or r increase, so does p∗. So it seems that lower loan amounts
induce cooperative behavior; this may explain why for relatively high amounts,
microentrepreneurs apply for (and MFIs hand out) individual rather than group
loans. On the one hand, a microentrepreneur avoids the high risk of peers not
cooperating; on the other hand, the MFI avoids the risk of lending to a group with
insufficient creditworthiness.
10. Conclusions
The main contribution of my paper has been to provide a new application of the
theory of global games, expanding it to the study of microfinance group lending.
With the exception of a single paper by Bond and Rai [BR09] in the development
economics literature, mine is indeed the first analysis of solidarity group lending
in terms of a global game. Through a rich payoff structure, I have analyzed the
extent to which social cohesion in a community of microentrepreneurs motivates
cooperation towards success of a group loan.
Compared to previous analyses of the cooperative behavior of microfinance bor-
rowers, the global game framework highlights the role of strategic uncertainty. Even
in the absence of uncertainty regarding the fundamentals of the business environ-
ment, uncertainty regarding the actions taken by one’s peers may still be severe.
The switching equilibrium, at which a group member decides to go for a safe project
- thereby contributing towards the success of the group loan - is a function of the
number of her peers she believes will also go for a safe project.
The risk premium on alternative risky projects and the threat of social sanctions
play an important role. I have illustrated the conditions under which coordination
on the socially optimal outcome is easier to achieve: when risky projects have a
low probability of success and/or yield low expected returns; when safe projects
yield high sure returns; when loan amounts and interest rates are relatively low;
and when the MFI’s business support services have a high (non-monetary) value.
This last point highlights the importance of non-monetary benefits accompanying
microfinance loans.
The results I have obtained in this paper can be of special interest to microfinance
lenders. The main issue is the extent to which the debt capacity of groups of
borrowers, rather than that of individual borrowers, depends on the strength of
social cohesion. I have also highlighted how this model may be of use to determine
the loan amount up to which group loans work better than individual loans, and
vice versa. But further investigation is required to clarify the role played here by
social cohesion.
A final question is whether fear of social ostracism or benefiting from MFI ser-
vices matters more in inducing cooperative behavior among group loan members.
In terms of the model at hand, this question concerns the relative importance of c∗
compared to Z. Here again, further research is needed to answer this question.
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Appendix A. Payoffs for the 3-player, 2-action game
For a 3-player (i, j, l), 2-action (S, R) game, the payoffs are as follows.
(Πi,S ; Πj,S ; Πl,S) =
(
(YS − (1 + r)L) + Z;
(YS − (1 + r)L) + Z;
(YS − (1 + r)L) + Z
)
.
(Πi,S ; Πj,S ; Πl,R) =
(
piR (YS − (1 + r)L) + (1− piR)
(
YS − 32(1 + r)L
)
+ Z;
piR (YS − (1 + r)L) + (1− piR)
(
YS − 32(1 + r)L
)
+ Z;
piR (YR − (1 + r)L)− c+ Z) .
(Πi,S ; Πj,R; Πl,S) =
(
piR (YS − (1 + r)L) + (1− piR)
(
YS − 32(1 + r)L
)
+ Z
piR (YR − (1 + r)L)− c+ Z;
piR (YS − (1 + r)L) + (1− piR)
(
YS − 32(1 + r)L
)
+ Z
)
.
(Πi,S ; Πj,R; Πl,R) = ((YS − (1 + r)L) ;
piR (YR − (1 + r)L)− c;
piR (YR − (1 + r)L)− c) .
(Πi,R; Πj,S ; Πl,S) = (piR (YR − (1 + r)L)− c+ Z;
piR (YS − (1 + r)L) + (1− piR)
(
YS − 32(1 + r)L
)
+ Z;
piR (YS − (1 + r)L) + (1− piR)
(
YS − 32(1 + r)L
)
+ Z
)
.
(Πi,R; Πj,S ; Πl,R) = (piR (YR − (1 + r)L)− c;
(YS − (1 + r)L) ;
piR (YR − (1 + r)L)− c) .
(Πi,R; Πj,R; Πl,S) = (piR (YR − (1 + r)L)− c;
piR (YR − (1 + r)L)− c;
(YS − (1 + r)L)) .
(Πi,R; Πj,R; Πl,R) = (piR (YR − (1 + r)L)− c;
piR (YR − (1 + r)L)− c;
piR (YR − (1 + r)L)− c) .
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Appendix B. Proof of (6.4)
Proof as in Morris and Shin [MS03] that the integral (6.4) does not depend onm.
Proof. Begin by noting that
zm(1− z)n−m = zm
n−m∑
i=0
(
n−m
i
)
(−1)i zi
=
n−m∑
i=0
(
n−m
i
)
(−1)i zm+i.
Thus ∫
zm(1− z)n−m dz =
n−m∑
i=0
(
n−m
i
)
(−1)i z
m+i+1
m+ i+ 1
,
so that ∫ 1
0
zm(1− z)n−m dz =
n−m∑
i=0
(
n−m
i
)
(−1)i
m+ i+ 1
.
However,
n−m∑
i=0
(
n−m
i
)
(−1)i
m+ i+ 1
=
m! (n−m)!
(n+ 1)!
=
1
(n+ 1)
(
n
m
) .
Thus (
n
m
)∫ 1
0
zm(1− z)n−m dz = 1
n+ 1
.
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VALUE CHAIN FINANCING
AND LOCAL INTERACTION GAMES
MIRET PADOVANI
Abstract. Value chain financing is of great importance to the agricultural
sector of most developing countries. Microfinance institutions may contribute
to the strength of chain links by handing out loans. I view an agricultural
value chain as a network, where links between nodes denote social and busi-
ness relationships between chain actors. By studying internode relationships
in terms of local interaction games, I address the issue of whether and how net-
work structure and social cohesion may spread coordination on safe investment
choices from a local level to the entire value chain.
1. Introduction
Ever since the take-off of microfinance in the seventies, microfinance institu-
tions (MFIs) have been involved in several innovative financing schemes. Their
goal has been to improve the livelihoods of poor communities, by endorsing the
entrepreneurial skills of people who would otherwise not have access to banking
facilities. In this paper I take a game-theoretic look at agricultural value chain
financing, a field in which MFIs are becoming increasingly involved.
A value chain is a supply chain consisting of the input suppliers, producers,
processors, and buyers that bring a product from its conception to its end use.
Value chain financing is of great importance to the economy of most developing
countries.1 A recent conference by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on
“Financing agricultural value chains” has highlighted the risks faced by independent
farmers:2
“[I]ndependent farmers, faced with dramatic price risks, will even-
tually become broken links in fragmented chains, unable to survive
competition. [. . . ] [T]oday’s markets require integrated systems
of differentiated production in which farmers, processors and mar-
keters work interdependently. These producers can become and
remain competitive if they have modern, well-organized chains and
dynamic, flexible financial services.”
The role of MFIs in value chain financing has been steadily increasing, as Piana
[Pia08] ascertains in a recent study:
“MFIs in different locations can turn out to finance broad and
overlapping groups of businesses, who could become suppliers and
Date: First version: January 2010. This version: February 18, 2010.
Key words and phrases. Value chain financing; microfinance; local interaction games; networks.
I thank Hyun Song Shin and Paolo Vanini for several discussions on this topic and helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
1See Fries and Akin [FA04] on the significance of value chains in rural finance.
2See Quiros [Qui07] for the conference papers.
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clients to each other. It’s frequently the case that, in different times
and across different MFIs, their customers comprehend agricultural
growers, small processors, craftsmen and manufacturers, street ven-
dors, small shops, and even transport and logistic operators as well
as other specialised input and service providers.”
MFIs hand out a variety of loan types, which can be categorized into individual
loans, group loans, and village loans. Individual loans tend to be awarded to larger
businesses and for larger sums of money. MFIs also assist their clients in setting
up their new businesses.
As microentrepreneurs typically lack physical collateral which they can pledge
against the loans they receive, MFIs need to make use of collateral substitutes.
An MFI can in most settings exploit the social sanction opportunities that exist
between borrowers. Social collateral generated with group formation and imposition
of joint responsibility at the group level may be deemed as an effective substitute
for conventional creditworthiness. As such, social collateral offers a guarantee for
loan repayment and minimizes potential loan defaults.
Social sanctions may take several forms. Defecting borrowers may be excluded
from privileged access to input supplies, from further trade credit, from social and
religious events, or from day-to-day courtesies. The threat of such sanctions is more
credible the smaller the village community.3 Indeed, the strength of social sanctions
mirrors the strength of social cohesion, i.e. the network of social relationships
binding people together in communities and neighborhoods.
It is hard to give a precise definition of social collateral, given its multiple facets.
Nevertheless, it is worthy to note at this stage the distinction made in the sociology
literature between social capital and social cohesion, both of which constitute a
type of social collateral:
“Social capital is a characteristic of the individual, defined as the
current sacrifice in time, effort, or money made by that individual
in the hope of promoting productive cooperation or coordination
with others (Osberg [Osb03]).”
On the other hand,
“Social cohesion is a characteristic of the society or collective that
depends on the history of the accumulation of social capital in the
group and which, in turn, affects the incentives for current social
capital investments (Osberg [Osb03]).”
Both aspects of social collateral are crucial for the success of microfinance: social
capital determines the creditworthiness of individual borrowers, social cohesion that
of an entire group of borrowers. My interest in this paper focusses on the latter.4
The literature on the role of social collateral in microfinance lending has been
to date confined to solidarity group lending, where 5 to 6 microentrepreneurs share
joint liability. With a very few exceptions,5 it also abstains from any network
structure considerations. Yet the findings are also interesting for the study of value
chain financing in developing countries. Empirical studies give, however, a mixed
3See discussion in Armendariz and Morduch [AM05].
4Osberg [Osb03] analyzes the economic implications of social cohesion. This field of research
is concerned with the question of whether differences in trust, social capital, social cohesion can
explain differences in the economic performance of world regions. See also Dayton-Johnson [DJ01].
5See Ambrus et al. [AMS08], on which I say more below.
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picture concerning the extent to which social cohesion affects the performance of
group lending. Differences in results sometimes seem to depend on the proxy used.
Wydick [Wyd99] shows that groups of strangers can do as well as groups of friends
- if not even better. Social ties per se have little impact on the performance of
borrowing groups. What really matter are peer monitoring and group pressure.
Peer monitoring denotes the ability of borrowers to monitor the investment behavior
of another during the course of the loan, making sure that each group member
undertakes only safe investment projects with borrowed capital; whereas, group
pressure denotes the ability to threaten exclusion of non-paying members from
continued access to credit. Since friends may be softer and more forgiving on each
other, it is not necessarily true that stronger social ties lead to higher repayment
rates.
On the other hand, subsequent field experiments conducted in several devel-
oping countries by the same author,6 as well as research by Gomez and Santor
[GS03] demonstrate that the strength and credibility of the threat of social sanc-
tions against defaulting members is the key determinant in group loan performance.
Ambrus et al. [AMS08] bring network structure into the picture and study the
effectiveness of network-based insurance among microentrepreneurs. The authors
ask when, and to what extent, do networks allow local shocks to be shared globally.
While the inspiration for my work is the literature on the extent to which social
cohesion and the threat of social sanctions may explain high repayment rates on
microfinance loans,7 the modeling framework is related to the literature on local
interaction games on networks. Local interaction games consist of a local interac-
tion system describing how players interact and the payoffs they derive from those
interactions. I apply to a microfinance context the game framework formalized by
Morris [Mor00], who addresses the question of whether there exists a finite group
of players, such that if that group starts out playing some action, best response
dynamics will ensure that that action is eventually played out everywhere. The
question I ultimately aim to answer is whether and how network structure and
social cohesion may spread coordination on the socially desirable outcome from a
local level to the entire value chain.8 To the best of my knowledge, there has never
been an analysis of microfinance loans for value chain financing in terms of local
interaction games on networks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
microfinance local interaction game taking place between chain actors. Sections 3 to
6 analyze several network structures and their corresponding contagion thresholds.
Section 8 discusses group properties leading to a higher probability of contagion.
Section 9 concludes and suggests further research.
2. Microfinance local interaction games
Direct financial agreements between actors on a value chain are very common
in both developing and developed economies. This is typically known as trade
credit. In developing countries, the financial flows often take the form of in-kind
6See Cassar et al. [CCW07], Cassar and Wydick [CW09], and Wydick et al. [WHK09].
7See Karlan [Kar07], Karlan et al. [KMRS09], and Ambrus et al. [AMS08].
8There is a burgeoning literature on different applications of network theory to financial markets.
For a survey on networks in finance see Allen and Babus [AB09]. Experimental literature on
coordination in financial networks includes Gale and Kariv [GK08].
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transfers: e.g. a lender may advance fertilizer for payment at a later date, then
receive payment in the form of produce. So-called ‘indirect’ value chain financing is
instead composed of financing from banks or MFIs. Such funding is the focus of my
paper. Loans received from financial institutions offer microentrepreneurs several
benefits over informal or peer-to-peer loans: longer term investment capital rather
than just short term working capital; larger nominal amounts; more transparent
loan pricing; more secure markets, etc.
I analyze a value chain in terms of its network structure. I apply to a microfinance
context the local interaction game framework formalized by Morris [Mor00]. A
local interaction game consists of a local interaction system describing how players
interact and their payoffs from those interactions.
In the context of this paper, a local interaction system consists of a countably
infinite set H of microentrepreneurs (the ‘players’) involved in a value chain and a
binary relation ∼ on this set. The relation ∼ denotes a business and possibly also
social link between two chain actors. In network jargon: if i ∼ j, node i is said to
be a neighbor of node j. The value of each link is denoted by cij and corresponds
to the amount of social collateral a microentrepreneur can ‘pledge’ against a loan
she takes from an MFI.
So a local interaction system is a pair (H,∼), with ∼ satisfying the following
four properties:9
(1) Irreflexivity: No player is his own neighbor.
(2) Symmetry: If i is a neighbor of j, then j is a neighbor of i.
(3) Bounded neighbors: Each player has at most a finite number of neighbors.
(4) Connectedness: There is some path connecting any pair of players.
I abide by the notation by Morris [Mor00] and denote by Γi the set of neighbors
of microentrepreneur i, i.e. Γi ≡ {x′ : x′ ∼ x}. The group X, a subset of H, is the
group of peers with whom i enters into business transactions.
Each microentrepreneur is given a loan with face value L and can undertake one
of two projects: either a safe project, yielding YS for sure (i.e. with probability of
success piS = 1), or a risky project, yielding YR > YS with probability of success
piR < 1 and 0 otherwise. A borrower has to repay her loan only if her project is
successful; she may not use wealth from other investments to repay the current
investment’s loan. Undertaking a safe project is the socially desirable outcome,
since it contributes to successful continuation of the value chain. The risk premium
represents, therefore, the tension between the socially desirable outcome and the
outcome resulting from the self-interested action of chain actors.
Note that we may also think of households, rather than individual borrowers.
E.g. a household owning a coffee bean farm. Investment decisions are taken by
the household as a whole and there is no need to model coordination within the
household itself. But for the remainder of the paper, I will simply refer to nodes as
‘borrowers’.
The success of borrowers’ projects are independent. Borrowers do not commu-
nicate their investment choices and ex ante observation of investment choices is
not possible. This assumption begs the question of whether ex ante observation
is truly never possible in microfinance investments, or only sometimes. Though
the nature of the business may very well be observable (e.g. producing scarves),
9For the technical details of these properties, see Morris [Mor00].
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the instruments used for production, for example, may not be. So using defective
machinery can be interpreted as undertaking a risky investment.
Also note that the assumption of projects’ outcomes being independent does not
mean that the businesses themselves are independent - they do, indeed, belong to
the same value chain. The independence assumption refers to the fact that the risk
source (which is not a priori observable) does not depend on the characteristics of
the value chain and of its linkages.
After ex post observation of a risky choice taken by chain actor i, her neighbor
j can impose on her a social sanction, which is represented by the loss of link value
cij . Let us denote by Πa,a′ the payoff of a microentrepreneur from a particular
interaction if she invests in project a and her neighbor invests in project a′. This
payoff function leads us to the following symmetric payoff matrix:
i; j S R
S (ΠS,S ; ΠS,S) (ΠS,R; ΠR,S)
R (ΠR,S ; ΠS,R) (ΠR,R; ΠR,R)
The payoffs in the matrix above are given by
(ΠS,S ; ΠS,S) = (YS − (1 + r)L+∆c; YS − (1 + r)L+∆c) ,
(ΠR,S ; ΠS,R) = (piR (YR − (1 + r)L)− cij ; YS − (1 + r)L− cij) ,
(ΠS,R; ΠR,S) = (YS − (1 + r)L− cij ; piR (YR − (1 + r)L)− cij) ,
and
(ΠR,R; ΠR,R) = (piR (YR − (1 + r)L)− cij ; piR (YR − (1 + r)L)− cij) .
The term ∆c denotes the additional link value added to a link (i, j) when inter-
action between microentrepreneurs i and j is successful. I.e. ∆c is added to the
social capital accumulated until then, cij , and the new value of the link becomes
∆c + cij .
It is assumed that this game has two strict Nash equilibria, namely “Both invest
in safe projects” and “Both invest in risky projects”, so that
ΠS,S > ΠR,S ; ΠR,R > ΠS,R.
Hence, link value cij satisfies
YS − (1 + r)L+∆c ≥ pii,R (YR − (1 + r)L)− cij ≥ YS − (1 + r)L.
The risk premium net of social sanctions lies somewhere within the interval [0,∆c].
Since
YS − (1 + r)L+∆c ≥ pii,R (YR − (1 + r)L)− cij ,
the equilibria are Pareto-rankable and it is in both microentrepreneurs’ interest to
coordinate on undertaking safe investments. A coordination failure arises when the
Pareto-superior equilibrium fails to be selected.
Remark 2.1. In the remainder of the paper, I assume all links have the same value
cij = c and can be increased by the same amount ∆c. I also simplify the notation
as follows.
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• E [YR] = piR (YR − (1 + r)L), the expected return on the risky project -
after paying back the loan principal plus interest;
• YS = YS − (1 + r)L, the sure return on the safe project - after paying back
the loan principal plus interest;
• P = E [YR]− YS , the gross risk premium.
When the risk premium net of social sanctions lies within the dominance thresh-
olds derived above, 0 and ∆c, investment in a safe project is a best response for
chain actor i if she assigns at least probability
q =
D − C
(A− C) + (D −B)
to her neighbor j investing in a safe project, too. Substituting, q is given by
q =
E [YR]− c− YS
∆c − c .
Now a local interaction game is a 3-tuple (H,∼, q).
Following Morris [Mor00], I describe best responses as follows. A configuration
is a function s mapping the set of chain actors to the set of possible investments
choices, i.e. s : H → {S,R}. Given configuration s, chain actor i’s best response is
to invest in the project that maximizes the sum of her payoffs from her interactions
with each of her neighbors. Therefore, investing in a safe project is a best response
to configuration s for microentrepreneur i if∑
j∈Γ(i)
ΠS,s(j) ≥
∑
j∈Γ(i)
ΠR,s(j).
Then investment in a safe project is a best response for borrower i if she believes
at least proportion q of her neighbors on the network will invest in a safe project.
Investment in a risky project is a best response if at least proportion (1− q) of her
neighbors invest in a risky project.
2.1. Contagion on networks. Network studies are mostly concerned with either
one of two aspects: the process by which networks form (‘connection’) or the way
networks operate to influence nodes’ behavior (‘contagion’). The seminal work on
threshold models for collective behavior and contagion in social networks is that
by Granovetter [Gra78].10 The concept of ‘contagion threshold’ is widespread in
several disciplines, ranging from epidemiology to viral marketing. As an example,
the ‘epidemic threshold’ studied in epidemiology depicts the critical rate of infection
for epidemic transition. But the notion of network contagion has a variety of
interesting applications in business and finance, too, such as when studying the
diffusion of financial innovations.
In this paper, I consider contagion of safe investment choices made by value
chain actors. Take, as an example, an Ethiopian household managing a coffee
bean washing station.11 To set up its business, the household requires a washing
machine, an artificial dryer, plus an automobile for transporting the washed beans
to export firms. One alternative for the household is to take an individual loan for
the entire funding amount it needs; another alternative is to enter a group loan,
where it would share jointly liability with other microentrepreneurs. The loans I
consider in this paper are individual liability loans.
10Gladwell [Gla00] provides an interesting introduction on social epidemics.
11On coffee growing in Ethiopia, see the FAO’s document at link.
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Figure 3.1. Interaction on a line network. Example of a coffee
value chain.
Note that, even in absence of joint liability, it is important for chain actors to
successfully coordinate on investing the borrowed funds safely. Only when initial
loans are paid back, does an MFI offer business assistance to its clients and the
opportunity of further loans at more favorable terms. These benefits positively
feed back to the entire value chain. If the good outcome spreads throughout the
network, then this contributes to a successful value chain - from coffee production
to coffee marketing.
Employing the terminology of the local interaction games framework formalized
by Morris [Mor00], the contagion threshold ξ is the largest q such that, if some
finite group of players starts out playing some action (say, choosing safe investment
projects), best response dynamics will ensure that that action is eventually played
everywhere.
Definition 2.2 (Contagion threshold). The contagion threshold ξ of local inter-
action system (H,∼) is the largest q such that choice of safe investment projects
spreads by best response from some finite group to the entire value chain.
In the following sections, I analyze microfinance games on specific network struc-
tures. In doing so, I choose network structures which suitably describe value chains
and give the contagion threshold in terms of social cohesion within a microfinance
context.
3. Interaction on a line
I start by considering interaction on a simple line network. As figure 3.1 il-
lustrates through the example of the labor intensive coffee value chain, microen-
trepreneurs are arranged along a line and each one of them enters into business
agreements with the individual to her left and the one to her right. This network
structure can be useful to describe a very simple chain, where every activity on the
chain is carried out by a single microentrepreneur or household and every chain
actor has a single supplier and a single buyer.
When microentrepreneurs interact on a line network, there are - from microen-
trepreneur i’s perspective - three possible configurations: neither neighbor invests
in a safe project; only one neighbor invests in a safe project; both neighbors invest
in a safe project. The following conditions need to hold under each possible con-
figuration so that it is a best response for microentrepreneur i to invest in a safe
project:
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• Given the configuration under which neither neighbor invests in a safe
project, it is a best response for microentrepreneur i to invest in a safe
project if
YS − 2c > E [YR]− 2c.
Rearranging,
0 > P,
but we know that a negative risk premium is implausible. Hence, this
condition cannot hold.
• Given the configuration under which only one neighbor invests in a safe
project, it is a best response for microentrepreneur i to invest in a safe
project if
YS +∆c − c > E [YR]− 2c,
or
c+∆c > P.
• Given the configuration under which both neighbors invest in a safe project,
it is a best response for microentrepreneur i to invest in a safe project if
YS + 2∆c > E [YR]− 2c,
or
2 (c+∆c) > P.
These conditions can be generalized into the following proposition, which not
only applies to the line network, but also - as I will show below - to all other
network structures considered in this paper.
Proposition 3.1. Given the configuration under which x neighbors invest in a safe
project, it is a best response for microentrepreneur i to invest in a safe project if
the risk premium is lower than x (c+∆c).
Corollary 3.2. Given the configuration under which neither neighbor invests in
a safe project, it is never a best response for microentrepreneur i to invest in a
safe project, since that would require the implausible condition of a negative risk
premium.
Corollary 3.2 highlights the irrelevance of the threat of social sanctions in induc-
ing cooperation on the socially best outcome when all neighbors act egoistically.
3.1. Contagion on a line. Morris shows that the contagion threshold for inter-
action on a line is ξ = 12 .
If q < 12 , then investment in a safe project is a best response whenever at least
one neighbor invests in a safe project, too. Thus, if two neighboring chain actors
i and i + 1 invest in a safe project in the initial period, actors i − 1, i, i + 1, and
i+2 must all go for a safe investment in the next period, actors i−2, i−1, i, i+1,
i+2, and i+3 must all go for a safe investment in the following period, and so on.
But if q > 12 , then investment in a safe project is a best response only when both
neighbors invest in a safe project.
In this context, q < 12 translates into the following condition on the risk premium:
E [YR]− c− YS
∆c − c <
1
2
,
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or
1
2
(∆c + c) > P ;
which leads us to proposition 3.3.
Proposition 3.3. Contagion of safe investment decisions occurs throughout the
line-shaped value chain when the risk premium is lower than 12 (∆c + c).
4. Interaction on a binary tree
Define a walk as a sequence of links connecting a sequence of nodes. A cycle is a
walk that starts and ends at the same node, with all nodes appearing once except
the starting node, which also appears as the ending node. A tree is a connected
network that has no cycles. As figure 4.1 illustrates, each node is linked to n nodes
to its right. For n = 2, we get a binary tree, as in figure 4.2.
The tree structure can, too, represent a value chain, where every chain actor
has one supplier but several buyers. The chain is then composed of interrelated
sequential and parallel functions involved in the production, manufacturing, and
marketing of goods. Having more links on a binary tree than on a line means that
each chain actor has more social collateral to provide and can, therefore, take on
more credit to finance her business.
When microentrepreneurs interact on a binary tree, there are - from microen-
trepreneur i’s perspective - four possible configurations: neither neighbor invests
in a safe project; one neighbor invests in a safe project; two neighbors invest in a
safe project; all three neighbors invest in a safe project. The following conditions
need to hold under each possible configuration so that it is a best response for
microentrepreneur i to invest in a safe project:
• Given the configuration under which neither neighbor invests in a safe
project, it is a best response for microentrepreneur i to invest in a safe
project if
YS − 3c > E [YR]− 3c,
which - as seen above - cannot hold, since it would imply a negative risk
premium.
• Given the configuration under which one neighbor invests in a safe project,
it is a best response for microentrepreneur i to invest in a safe project if
YS +∆c − 2c > E [YR]− 3c,
or
c+∆c > P.
• Given the configuration under which two neighbors invest in a safe project,
it is a best response for microentrepreneur i to invest in a safe project if
YS + 2∆c − c > E [YR]− 3c,
or
2 (c+∆c) > P.
• Given the configuration under which all three neighbors invest in a safe
project, it is a best response for microentrepreneur i to invest in a safe
project if
YS + 3∆c > E [YR]− 3c,
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Figure 4.1. Interaction on a multiple-branch tree.
or
3 (c+∆c) > P.
4.1. Contagion on a binary tree. Morris shows that the contagion threshold for
interaction on a binary tree is ξ = 13 . So if q <
1
3 , then investment in a safe project
is a best response whenever at least one neighbor invests in a safe project, too.
This requires the risk premium to fulfill the following condition:
E [YR]− c− YS
∆c − c <
1
3
,
or
1
3
∆c +
2
3
c > P ;
which leads us to proposition 4.1.
Proposition 4.1. Contagion of safe investment decisions occurs throughout the
binary tree value chain when the risk premium is lower than 13∆c +
2
3c.
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Figure 4.2. Interaction on a binary tree.
5. Interaction on an n-branch tree
The population is arranged on an n-branch tree, with n > 2. So each player
has one direct neighbor to the left and n direct neighbors to the right. In terms
of a value chain: every chain actor has one supplier but n buyers. One example of
a chain actor on an n-branch tree may be a cooperative of coffee bean processors
buying beans from one smallholder farmer and supplying to n exporters.
When microentrepreneurs interact on an n-branch tree, there are - from microen-
trepreneur i’s perspective - n+ 2 possible configurations: neither neighbor invests
in a safe project; one neighbor invests in a safe project; two neighbors invest in a
safe project; . . . ; n neighbors invest in a safe project; n+1 neighbors invest in a safe
project. The following conditions need to hold under each possible configuration so
that it is a best response for microentrepreneur i to invest in a safe project:
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• Given the configuration under which neither neighbor invests in a safe
project, it is a best response for microentrepreneur i to invest in a safe
project if
YS − (n+ 1)c > E [YR]− (n+ 1)c.
• Given the configuration under which one neighbor invests in a safe project,
it is a best response for microentrepreneur i to invest in a safe project if
YS +∆c − nc > E [YR]− (n+ 1)c,
or
c+∆c > P.
• Given the configuration under which two neighbors invest in a safe project,
it is a best response for microentrepreneur i to invest in a safe project if
YS + 2∆c − (n− 1)c > E [YR]− (n+ 1)c,
or
2 (c+∆c) > P.
• . . .
• Given the configuration under which all n + 1 neighbors invest in a safe
project, it is a best response for microentrepreneur i to invest in a safe
project if
YS + (n+ 1)∆c > E [YR]− (n+ 1)c,
or
(n+ 1) (c+∆c) > P.
5.1. Contagion on an n-branch tree. The contagion threshold for interaction
on an n-branch tree is ξ = 1n+1 . So if q <
1
n+1 , safe investment decisions spread
throughout the n-branch tree via best response dynamics.
This requires the risk premium to fulfill the following condition:
E [YR]− c− YS
∆c − c <
1
n+ 1
,
or
1
n+ 1
∆c +
n
n+ 1
c > P ;
which leads us to proposition 5.1.
Proposition 5.1. Contagion of safe investment decisions occurs throughout the
n-branch tree value chain when the risk premium is lower than 1n+1∆c +
n
n+1c.
6. Interaction on n-component regions
The population is divided into a number of regions of n microentrepreneurs each.
Each microentreprenuer in a region interacts with every other microentrepreneur
in that region, as well as with an entrepreneur in each neighboring region.
This structure may describe the situation in which chain actors act independently
rather than in cooperatives or unions. This can also be the case when services from
one step to the other in the chain need to be highly customized. Take, as in figure
6.1, the local entrepreneurs involved from one end of the value chain to the other,
and assume each of the chain functions is carried out by n agents.
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Figure 6.1. Interaction on an n-component regional network,
with n = 3.
When microentrepreneurs interact on n-component regions, there are - from
microentrepreneur i’s perspective - n + 2 possible configurations, just as in the n-
branch tree structure analyzed in the previous section. Thus, the conditions that
need to hold under each possible configuration so that it is a best response for
microentrepreneur i to invest in a safe project are the same as the ones outlined
for the n-branch tree.
6.1. Contagion on n-component regions. The contagion threshold when inter-
action takes place in regions of n players is ξ = 1n+1 , just as for the n-branch tree.
So, once again, we get the following condition for the risk premium:
E [YR]− c− YS
∆c − c <
1
n+ 1
,
or
1
n+ 1
∆c +
n
n+ 1
c > P ;
which leads us to proposition 6.1.
Proposition 6.1. Contagion of safe investment decisions occurs throughout the n-
component regional value chain when the risk premium is lower than 1n+1∆c+
n
n+1c.
7. Further discussion
A numerical example may help us summarize the results derived above. Assume
all links have current value c = 100, and may increase by ∆c = 10, if business
relationships are successful. If chain actors interact along a line, then coordination
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on the safe project succeeds if
P <
1
2
(100 + 10) ,
i.e. if the risk premium on the risky project is not higher than 55. If, instead,
each chain actor interacts with one supplier and two buyers on a binary tree, then
coordination on the safe project succeeds if
P <
1
2
(2 ∗ 100 + 10) ,
i.e. if the risk premium on the risky project is not higher than 70. And for the case
with three buyers, the risk premium need not be higher than 77.5.
As the number of business neighbors increases, the condition on the risk premium
gets looser. Take, for example, interaction on a five-component regional network:
the risk premium should then not exceed 85. The upper limit on the risk premium
tends to 100 as the number of neighbors tends to infinity.
Proposition 7.1. As the number of business partners for each chain actor in-
creases, the condition on the risk premium becomes less restrictive and contagion
of the good outcome easier to achieve. As n tends to infinity, the upper limit on
the risk premium P tends to the value c of a single link.
Proposition 7.1 confirms the intuition that a chain actor involved in a wider
network of partners has more social capital at stake when acting egoistically. She
will therefore tend to act in the interest of her network, even when the risk premium
is relatively high.
The next proposition summarizes the contagion thresholds for the network struc-
tures analyzed in the previous sections.
Proposition 7.2. The contagion thresholds for different network structures are:
• On a line network:
1
2
(∆c + c) > P ;
• On a binary tree:
1
3
(∆c + c) > P ;
• On an n-branch tree:
1
n+ 1
∆c +
n
n+ 1
c > P ;
• On n-component regions:
1
n+ 1
∆c +
n
n+ 1
c > P.
To see how these results change as the variables of the model change, let us
first consider the expected return on the risky and safe projects. As the expected
return from the risky project, E [YR], increases (either through an increase of pii,R
or YR), the risk premium increases, making contagion of safe investment choices
throughout the network less probable. The same effect occurs when the sure return
from the safe project, YS , decreases. This effect can be offset by an increase in link
values c, by an increase in ∆c, or both. That is, a higher threat of social sanctions
offsets the private benefits an entrepreneur would derive if acting egoistically.
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8. Group properties for contagion
Contagion of safe investment choices is easier to achieve throughout networks
where the contagion threshold is closer to its upper bound, 12 . Morris [Mor00] shows
that this condition is fulfilled when a group of nodes satisfies two properties.12 First
of all, there needs to be low neighbor growth, meaning that the number of players
who can be reached in k steps grows less than exponentially in k. Low neighbor
growth occurs if there is a tendency for players’ neighbors’ neighbors to be their
own neighbors. In social networks, this property is satisfied for groups of closely-
related individuals. Since the threat of social sanctions is more credible in small
village communities among very close friends and relatives, as in the most typical
microfinance settings, it is reasonable to believe that this property holds among
microfinance borrowers. Although links between chain actors on an agricultural
value chain are of a business nature, family ties cannot be excluded whenever the
activities are located in close geographical proximity.
The second group property Morris [Mor00] suggests needs to hold for successful
network coordination is that the local interaction system is sufficiently uniform.
So there is some number α s.t. for all players a long way from some core group,
roughly proportion α of their neighbors are closer to the core group. We may in-
terpret of uniformity in the microfinance context as microentrepreneurs belonging
to the same cultural group. Several empirical studies on microfinance lending sur-
veyed by Armendariz and Morduch [AM05] reveal that less diverse groups tend to
have higher repayment rates - unless there is a possibility of collusion against the
bank. In a trust game experiment conducted in a Peruvian microcredit program,
Karlan [Kar07] considers cultural similarity as indicated by language, hair, dress,
geographical proximity; he shows that members of groups with higher cultural sim-
ilarity trust each other more and have higher repayment rates.
9. Conclusions and further research
My aim in this paper has been to apply game-theoretical tools to shed light on
the potential for MFIs to supply financial services to a value chain. My focus has
been on the extent to which network structure and social cohesion induce chain
actors to work towards a socially desirable outcome rather than act solely in their
own self-interest.
The main result particularly worthy of note is that a chain actor with a higher
number of business links has more social capital at stake and will be less inclined
to act egoistically, notwithstanding a relatively high risk premium. This result
confirms the intuition that higher social cohesion induces cooperation towards the
socially best outcome. When choosing between a safe and a risky investment, a
higher threat of social sanctions offsets the private benefits an entrepreneur would
derive if acting egoistically.
This paper on interaction games on financial networks is a first step towards a
number of related issues I aim to address in future work.13 First of all, it would be
interesting to analyze how the results in this paper change when taking different
risk preferences or gradually diminishing / increasing quantities of supplied inputs.
Also, how would the results for the n-branch tree change if we inverted the tree, so
12See Morris [Mor00] for the technical details of these properties.
13I thank Paolo Vanini for helpful discussions on possible extensions of this paper.
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that each node had multiple suppliers and one buyer (rather than one supplier and
multiple buyers)? Another interesting question is whether any specific node in the
network is of crucial importance in inducing coordination. Such extensions may
help MFIs and traditional banks identify the optimal setting for them to intervene
in agricultural value chains.
References
[AB09] F. Allen and A. Babus. Networks in finance. In P. Kleindorfer and Y. Wind, editors,
The Network Challenge: Strategy, Profit, and Risk in an Interlinked World. 2009.
[AM05] B. Armendariz and J. Morduch. The Economics of Microfinance. MIT Press, 2005.
[AMS08] A. Ambrus, M. Mobius, and A. Szeidl. Consumption risk-sharing in social networks.
Working paper, Harvard University, 2008.
[CCW07] A. Cassar, L. Crowley, and B. Wydick. The effect of social capital on group loan
repayment: Evidence from field experiments. Economic Journal, 117:F85–F106, 2007.
[CW09] A. Cassar and B. Wydick. Does social capital matter? Evidence from a five-country
group lending experiment. Working paper, University of San Francisco, 2009.
[DJ01] J. Dayton-Johnson. Social Cohesion and Economic Prosperity. James Lorimer & Com-
pany, 2001.
[FA04] B. Fries and B. Akin. Value chains and their significance for addressing the rural
finance challenge. 2004.
[GK08] D. Gale and S. Kariv. Trading in networks: A normal form game experiment. Working
paper, New York University, 2008.
[Gla00] M. Gladwell. The Tipping Point. Little, Brown & Company, 2000.
[Gra78] M. Granovetter. Threshold models of collective behavior. American Journal of Soci-
ology, 83:1420–143, 1978.
[GS03] R. Gomez and E. Santor. Do peer group members outperform individual borrowers?
A test of peer group lending using Canadian micro-credit data. Working Paper, Bank
of Canada, 2003.
[Kar07] D. Karlan. Social connections and group banking. Economic Journal, 117:F52–F84,
2007.
[KMRS09] D. Karlan, M. Mobius, T. Rosenblat, and A. Szeidl. Trust and social collateral. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 124:1307–1361, 2009.
[Mor00] S. Morris. Contagion. Review of Economic Studies, 67:57–78, 2000.
[Osb03] L. Osberg. The Economic Implications of Social Cohesion. University of Toronto Press,
2003.
[Pia08] V. Piana. Working Paper, 2008.
[Qui07] R. Quiros, editor. Agriculture Value Chain Finance. FAO, 2007.
[WHK09] B. Wydick, H. Hayes, and S. Kempf. Social networks, neighborhood effects, and credit
access: Evidence from rural Guatemala. World Development, 2009.
[Wyd99] B. Wydick. Can social cohesion be harnessed to repair market failures? Evidence from
group lending in Guatemala. Economic Journal, 109:463–475, 1999.
Appendix A. Characterization of the contagion threshold
Morris [Mor00] shows that the contagion threshold corresponds to (i) the smallest
p such that every large group contains an infinite (1−p)-cohesive subgroup and (ii)
the largest p such that it is possible to label players so that, for any player with a
sufficiently high label, at least proportion p of his neighbors has a lower label.
Proposition A.1 (Cohesion). p-cohesion of a group of players describes the self-
contained interactions where every microentrepreneur interacts with some other
member in the group, rather than with someone outside the group. Cohesion of
a group X, c(X), is the smallest p such that every member in X has at least pro-
portion p of her neighbors within X (Morris [Mor00]).
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Proposition A.2 (Labeling). The labeling on a value chain would indicate the
position of an entrepreneur in the chain, e.g. a higher/lower label would mean a
position closer to the start of the chain. As an example, a coffee bean farmer may
have label 1 in a coffee value chain and a coffee shop owner in the city label 10,
with other 8 entrepreneurs operating in the middle of the chain.
The following immediate corollaries of propositions are useful in identifying con-
tagion thresholds in practice.
Corollary A.3 (Upper bound). If every co-finite group contains an infinite, (1−p)-
cohesive subgroup, then ξ ≤ p.
Corollary A.4 (Lower bound I). If there exists a labelling l such that αl(k) ≥ p
for all sufficiently large k, then ξ ≥ p.
An even simpler lower bound is a consequence of corollary A.4.
Corollary A.5 (Lower bound II). Let M be the maximal finite number of neighbors
each node can have; then ξ ≥ 1M .
For completeness of exposition, I reproduce here the derivation by Morris [Mor00]
of the contagion threshold for the network structures considered in this paper.
• On a line network:
Every co-finite group contains an infinite 12 -cohesive group of the form {x ∈
Z : x1 ≥ c}. So, by corollary A.3, ξ ≤ 12 . But ξ ≥ 12 by corollary A.5.• On an n-branch tree:
Every co-finite group contains an infinite nn+1 -cohesive group of the form
{x ∈ ⋃n′≥nHn′ : xk = x′k, for each k = 1, . . . , n}, for some xˆ ∈ Hn. So,
by corollary A.3, ξ ≤ 1n+1 . But ξ ≥ 1n+1 by corollary A.5.
• On an n-component regional network:
Every co-finite group contains an infinite 12 -cohesive group of the form {x ∈
Z : x1 ≥ c}. So, by corollary A.3, ξ ≤ 1n+1 . But ξ ≥ 1n+1 by corollary A.5.
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